Nacionalidad / Citizenship: Legal Uruguayan
It is amazing, at times, to witness legal and historical justifications for mistakes and injustices offered by those trained neither in the law nor in history. In fact, those trained in other disciplines sometimes stray into seeking to cloak excuses in both law and history without clearly understanding either.
I am grateful that we, as Uruguayans, are committed to the truth and clearing up these misunderstandings, together, wherever we find them.
I read yesterday about a mistaken justification for the current practice of placing the “nation of birth” of legal citizens in the passport field for “nationality.” This is despite the fact that not all legal citizens have such a nationality from a country of birth and despite the fact that OACI, the organization that standardizes passports, allows “citizenship” to be placed in the nationality field.
Listing the “nationality/citizenship” of Uruguayan legal citizens as “Uruguayan legal citizens” does not require any inquiry into who is and who is not a “national” of Uruguay. The English language controlling standards already indicate the field is for citizenship. I’ll explain more on that topic below as we explore why there might be so many mistakes in Uruguayan practice concerning the issuance of correct passports today.
So why would anyone in Uruguay defend the status quo of issuing passports to legal citizens of Uruguay that violate international standards and deviate from compliance with international human rights claim the DNIC must continue to do so? Let us try to understand in good faith and address the errors embedded in such a view with a willing intent to solve the problem together.
First, the author of the particular letter I referenced indicates, with obvious discomfort, that the current legal interpretation of the regulation granting passports allows the processing of the Uruguayan Passport before obtaining the Civic Credential. The author adds one cannot “exercise citizenship” until a legal citizen has that Civic Credential.
This is a mistake made vital by the omission of several words. It would be correct to say that a legal citizen cannot exercise certain rights of citizenship until obtaining a Civic Credential, but getting a passport is not one of those rights for legal citizens. Legal citizens are citizens the moment they are declared such by the Electoral Court.
Outstanding Uruguayan Constitutional scholars have explained that one becomes a legal citizen through the act of receiving a carta of citizenship. One such scholar makes abundantly clear that Uruguayan legal citizens are “citizens” immediately and must simply wait to “exercise the rights of citizenship,” that is, to vote, and even longer to hold office. But receiving a passport is not such a delayed right of citizenship. It is immediate.
Second, the author of this particular letter defending the current practice of the DNIC admits that “Uruguayan legal citizen” was recorded in the nationality field of all Uruguayan passports issued from the first common passport until “1997”, but claims this practice was somehow more justified in the past and throughout Uruguayan history prior to 1997 because “the interpretation of the legislation was more rigorous than today, as the passport was issued after processing the Civic Credential and thoroughly checking the voting records from electoral events to ensure that the person had not been removed from the electoral roll.”
Whether accurate or not, and we can briefly point out some of the mistakes later, the claims are irrelevant to the question of whether legal citizen passports are issued correctly. Despite the author’s personal opinion that issuing passports prior to receiving a Civic Credential is somehow wrong, or untrustworthy, the Manual de Documento de Identidad y Pasaporte Electrónico published in 2018, indicates on page 86 that a Civic Credential is not required to obtain a passport within the first three years of citizenship (because it would be impossible to obtain under Uruguayan law). The Civic Credential is necessary for a legal citizen to renew his or her passport (because, by that time, it can be obtained).
Third, the author claims that the change from “Uruguayan legal citizen” to the status of “foreigner” on passports was somehow related to the adoption of the MRZ on passports, that zone at the bottom of the page with letters, numbers, and symbols, allowing the passport to be easily scanned for what is called machine reading. In fact, the author claims that the first Uruguayan passport with the MRZ code was issued in 1998. It was not and that claim is made in mistake. The nationality field on Uruguayan passports was changed in 1994, and Uruguayan legal citizens were labeled as foreigners on those passports issued far in advance of the introduction of the MRZ.
Fourth, the author of this missive indicates that Uruguay implemented the new MRZ requirements in OACI Document 9303 on standardization in “strict compliance” with them. Again, this is clearly mistaken and inaccurate.
What is that not accurate? The author himself tells us why.
“For Legal Citizens, the nationality of the country of origin was recorded” in the nationality field and codes. I repeat the author claims strict compliance with Document 9303 because Uruguay itself decides what nationality its legal citizens are, without consulting these other nations in which they were born to see if it is true, and the just places that assumed nationality on international identification.
Clearly, the author fails to realize that the nationality field is actually for a “nationality” and that the majority of nations on earth do not grant nationality simply by being born in a nation. This must clearly represent a failure to understand what “nationality” is and the proper role of Uruguay in determining “nationality” on behalf of other nations. To be clear, Uruguay cannot determine for other nations who is and who is not a national of that foreign nation. That is a conceit that I do not believe other nations would appreciate. Uruguay would not appreciate other nations designating who are “Uruguayan nationals” based on laws of descent that do not exist in Uruguay but exist in those other nations.
Fifth, the author includes irrelevant information about the biometric data now embedded in passports and unrelated information on what belongs in each MRZ code field on the passports. The information the author uses to fill space is both true and completely beside the point. It is added almost as if it was placed there simply to confuse those only casually familiar with this subject. When seeking to use the standards to support his point that Uruguayan legal citizens should be listed with such random and unverified foreign nationalities the author makes one odd confession: “It is crucial that our documents clearly reflect the corresponding nationality” of the passport holder. But we have already clearly established that nation of birth has absolutely no bearing, legally, on whether a legal citizen is or ever has been a national of the nation of birth and, in addition, that whether such a person is a national of a nation of birth is far outside the scope of Uruguay’s authority to determine.
Clearly, the DNIC and the Ministry of the Interior will work to correct the dissemination and use of such mistaken information. It is vital that lawyers, especially those trained in comparative and international law, help all of us comply with international law. Civil society and scholars are attempting to correct the historical record, and information on the true history of the Uruguayan passport and the correct dates is available publicly. We can have faith that Uruguay will correct incorrect information based on misinterpretations.
But we also need to ensure that true technical experts are the ones making the decisions. OACI recently issued a document called TAG/TRIP/4 Flimsy No. 02, dated October 12, 2023, which clarified again that Document 9303-3, Section 7.1 notes that it is an error when “MRZ citizenship incorrectly reports the country of birth rather than citizenship.” Further, the recent publication explores the fact that English is the official language of the standards, and the word used in English for what goes in this field is citizenship.
It is helpful to be able to explore the places we all agree and those areas in which we can see clear misunderstandings and misinterpretations. I have faith that everyone in the Uruguayan State wishes to work together to issue internationally acceptable passports for legal citizens that do not contain what are, in effect, random, assumed, and often incorrect “nationalities.” The simple solution already provided to Uruguay is that the field is for “citizenship”.
Today we request immediate and unconditional access to the records of the Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil (DNIC)
I today sent a request pursuant to Law No. 18.381. Uruguay is committed to transparency and government accountability. In particular, I today requested all prior versions of the manual that instructs all employees on how to process identification and passport requests and, secondarily, all information around the period during which the passport and identification card of Uruguay were changed to indicate for the first time that legal citizens were foreigners. In addition, on suspicion that there have been recent email, internal messaging, paper, and other messaging application communication to, by, with, or from Comisario Mayor (R) Jose Luis Rondan Godoy, all communications mentioning nationality, citizneship, or passports was demanded.
Let’s see what we get. If the Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil plays games, produces less than what we know they have, or otherwise obstructs the march to justice on nationality, nothing could be better for me in the fight for recognition that legal citizens are and always have been nationals of Uruguay as defined by international law.
The information request is at this link.
Let’s get to it. I’m ready.
Adelante.
Information Request to Corte Electoral of Uruguay
Today, I submitted a demand for all information related to legal citizens held by the Electoral Court. Uruguay has a strong transparency and public information law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Electoral Court has twenty business days to respond. The letter is available here.
The letter is addressed to Dr. Wilfredo Penco, President of the Electoral Court of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. It is a formal request for access to information under Law 18.381, which guarantees public access to information in Uruguay. In the letter, I cite the specific articles of the law that outline the procedures for requesting and obtaining information from public agencies. The letter details the format preferences for information production, requests specific information regarding legal citizenship applications, and emphasizes the obligation of the Electoral Court to organize and provide access to requested information. It also includes in a list format of the requested information and reminds the Electoral Court of the deadline of twenty business days to respond.
Versión en español de la presentación ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos referente al PS 189 - Derecho a la nacionalidad y riesgo de apatridia en la legislación
La solicitud de Somos Todos Uruguayos para una audiencia temática ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se proporciona aquí completa en español. La solicitud fue concedida y la audiencia se llevará a cabo el 1 de marzo de 2024.
La audiencia concierne al cumplimiento actual de Uruguay con sus compromisos para poner fin a la apatridia y los problemas de derechos humanos relacionados con la nacionalidad. Somos Todos Uruguayos representa los intereses de más de 30,000 ciudadanos legales de Uruguay y aquellos en proceso de obtener la ciudadanía. La solicitud para una audiencia tenía como objetivo abordar los problemas surgidos de la negación arbitraria de la nacionalidad uruguaya a ciudadanos naturalizados, denominados "ciudadanos legales" en Uruguay. Destacamos la necesidad de una discusión sobre las obligaciones internacionales de Uruguay para prevenir y abordar la apatridia, enfatizando la prohibición de la privación arbitraria de la nacionalidad y la discriminación.
A pesar de los avances de Uruguay en derechos humanos y su liderazgo internacional, existe una clara contradicción en su política de negar la nacionalidad a individuos apátridas y revocar la nacionalidad de otros ciudadanos legales. Argumentamos que se necesita urgentemente una discusión temática para explorar las inconsistencias en las leyes de nacionalidad de Uruguay e identificar soluciones viables. Esperamos que el gobierno participe de buena fe y de manera significativa para abordar los problemas identificados en esta solicitud.
Desafiando las concepciones tradicionales de nacionalidad: una revisión crítica de las interpretaciones del Dr. Sapolinski y la defensa de un marco legal moderno en Uruguay (versión en Español)
En el ámbito de la erudición jurídica, la precisión y la adhesión a los estándares internacionalmente aceptados no son meros ideales, sino necesidades imperantes. Este ensayo examina críticamente la obra del Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski contenida en su artículo sobre "nacionalidad," publicado en la Revista de Derecho Constitucional, titulado "Nación, Nacionalidad y Estado en el Marco Institucional Uruguayo". El Dr. Sapolinski no aborda de manera notable las dimensiones históricas y de derechos humanos cruciales inherentes al concepto de nacionalidad. En lugar de ofrecer un análisis jurídico riguroso, su enfoque se inclina hacia perspectivas desfasadas, filosóficas y parroquiales que no cumplen con las demandas del moderno derecho internacional y los principios de derechos humanos. Además, no aplica los métodos aceptados de la metodología interpretativa constitucional uruguaya al Artículo 81 de la Constitución.
Esta crítica subraya la imperiosa necesidad de la erudición jurídica, especialmente en un sistema legal como el de Uruguay, que carece de interpretaciones judiciales definitivas, de alinearse con definiciones globalmente reconocidas y principios de derechos humanos. La erudición jurídica debe trascender interpretaciones subjetivas y visiones locales para abrazar una metodología históricamente informada y consciente de los derechos. Al desafiar las diversas definiciones de "nación" y "nacionalidad" del Dr. Sapolinski, esta réplica aboga por una interpretación de estos términos legalmente más robusta e inclusiva, consistente con las normas internacionales y respetuosa de los derechos de todos los ciudadanos, incluyendo a los inmigrantes.
Esta respuesta al Dr. Sapolinski no es meramente una crítica al trabajo de un colega académico, sino un llamado al rigor académico y al compromiso de mantener la integridad de los estándares legales internacionales en la interpretación de disposiciones constitucionales relacionadas con la nacionalidad en Uruguay. Es un empeño por honrar el legado de juristas estimados como Alberto Pérez Pérez, abogando por una erudición jurídica que Puente a la brecha entre interpretaciones nacionales y obligaciones internacionales, asegurando así que nuestra comprensión de la nacionalidad permanezca firmemente arraigada en el contexto más amplio de los derechos humanos y el consenso legal global.
I. Crítica al enfoque interpretativo del Dr. Sapolinski y su desviación del enfoque Pretendido
En su artículo, el Dr. Sapolinski, un distinguido profesor de Derecho Constitucional en la Universidad de la República, lamentablemente pasa por alto tanto la evolución histórica como las significativas implicaciones en derechos humanos de una definición de "nacionalidad" interpretada de manera restrictiva — postura que a menudo adopta un segmento de los académicos jurídicos uruguayos. El artículo del Dr. Sapolinski no necesitaba su análisis incluido sobre varios filósofos de los siglos XVIII y XIX, pero se habría beneficiado de la incorporación de normas legales internacionales.
La esencia del derecho es su capacidad para definir la terminología y los conceptos con precisión, facilitando su aplicación práctica en una sociedad regida por leyes. El deber primordial de los académicos jurídicos, particularmente en un sistema como el de Uruguay, carente de interpretaciones judiciales definitivas, es proporcionar interpretaciones de las leyes y disposiciones constitucionales que reflejen mejor su verdadera intención y alcance. La erudición jurídica excepcional no puede permitirse ser empañada por desviaciones filosóficas, argumentando que los significados son maleables e influenciados por experiencias individuales, antecedentes educativos, ideologías, creencias o intereses personales.
Este principio de una erudición cuidadosa y aceptada internacionalmente adquiere aún mayor significado cuando la labor académica implica descifrar el uso internacional de términos y frases encontrados en el derecho internacional consuetudinario — la ley universalmente reconocida y aplicable — así como en compromisos basados en tratados. Las terminologías legales internacionales poseen significados definidos. Cuando Uruguay ratifica un tratado, ejerciendo sus derechos soberanos como lo sanciona su Constitución, implícitamente respalda los significados internacionales de los términos empleados en el tratado. Si Uruguay disiente de estas interpretaciones aceptadas internacionalmente, retiene la prerrogativa de abstenerse de ratificar el tratado o expresar sus reservas explícitamente.
En su artículo, el Dr. Sapolinski sí articula un marco general para la interpretación constitucional en Uruguay. Plantea que tal interpretación debe inicialmente depender del significado literal del texto. Cuando esta interpretación literal resulta insuficiente, se debe recurrir a la intención explícita de la legislación o a su contexto histórico para obtener claridad. Se prefiere el significado natural y evidente de las palabras, salvo en instancias donde la legislación asigna una definición diferente, en casos que involucran jerga técnica que supera la interpretación aparente, o cuando un término está definido de manera distinta para fines legislativos.
Sin embargo, el artículo notablemente no logra especificar cuáles artículos constitucionales el Dr. Sapolinski pretende interpretar. No aborda el tema central del Seminario Taller, el taller, en el cual se presentó inicialmente el trabajo. Ese taller se organizó para analizar la ciudadanía legal a través del prisma de los derechos. En cambio, el trabajo del Dr. Sapolinski se desvía hacia una exploración de las sutilezas lingüísticas y contextos históricos de términos como "nación" y "nacionalidad", apartándose así de su enfoque previsto.
II. Examinando las múltiples definiciones de "nación" del Dr. Sapolinski y sus implicaciones
Dejando a un lado la omisión del artículo de una discusión sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos legales en Uruguay, y a pesar de que ese era el tema del taller en el que se presentó, es justificado analizar lo que el trabajo del Dr. Sapolinski pretende lograr.
El discurso del Dr. Sapolinski comienza delineando cuatro posibles interpretaciones lingüísticas del término "nación". La primera definición se basa en la etnicidad. Resulta algo sorprendente que el Dr. Sapolinski incluya una definición basada en la etnicidad entre sus definiciones. Esta perspectiva, que atribuye la identidad nacional a elementos estructurales únicos como rasgos físicos, características biológicas, rasgos culturales o incluso vestimenta, parece anacrónica para un análisis legal del siglo XXI. Históricamente, tal definición encontró favor en ciertos círculos europeos durante los siglos XIX y principios del XX, pero desde entonces ha sido ampliamente desacreditada como un concepto viable de nación.
Además, complicando las cosas, la narrativa del Dr. Sapolinski rápidamente se desvía de una discusión sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos legales a una confluencia de "nacionalidad" con la doctrina ideológica del "nacionalismo". Esta confluencia se hace evidente a través de su dependencia de una publicación de 2018 de Iván Romero sobre la historia del nacionalismo. Intrigantemente, el Dr. Sapolinski no rechaza de manera absoluta esta visión etnocéntrica de una nación. Romero explica que el nacionalismo basado en la etnicidad obtiene apoyo del controvertido trabajo de Joseph Arthur, Conde de Gobineau, autor del Ensayo sobre la Desigualdad de las Razas Humanas (1853-1855). En lugar de rechazar o simplemente omitir tal justificación, el Dr. Sapolinski la presenta como una posibilidad teórica para definir "nación", usándola como un trampolín para discutir la concepción de "nación" en Uruguay.
El Dr. Sapolinski argumenta que Uruguay rechaza la nacionalidad étnica, citando su enfoque "inclusivo" sobre lo que es la "nación" porque Uruguay incorpora en la nación a los "descendientes" (al menos aquellos nacidos en Uruguay) de diversos grupos étnicos. Los uruguayos de segunda generación incluyen, por ejemplo, a armenios, afrodescendientes e inmigrantes españoles o italianos. Él llama a tales "descendientes" Orientales. Sin embargo, esta explicación rápidamente cambia de enfoque y pierde persuasión, simplemente introduciendo una nueva categoría étnica, denominada "Oriental", evadiendo así el tema central, y obviamente cierra la oportunidad para que los ciudadanos legales sean Orientales.
La segunda definición proporcionada por el Dr. Sapolinski etiqueta a la "nación" como un concepto antropológico. Sugiere que la identidad nacional se forma a través de elementos culturales compartidos como el idioma, las tradiciones históricas, las costumbres, los símbolos y los relatos míticos. Esta perspectiva recibe apoyo, según el Dr. Sapolinski, del pensador del siglo XIX Ernest Renan, quien ha sido objeto de considerable crítica en la época moderna por sus vistas deterministas sobre las características raciales y sus opiniones polémicas sobre la "raza" semítica. Las concepciones antropológicas de la nación generalmente son benignas, pero no permiten la incorporación de múltiples tradiciones en una nación.
Mientras el Dr. Sapolinski hace referencia a la definición más inclusiva de Renan de una nación como un colectivo que aspira a vivir y lograr juntos, esta interpretación queda eclipsada por el legado controvertido de Renan. El trabajo de Renan no se alinea limpiamente con las comprensiones contemporáneas de la identidad nacional en el derecho internacional moderno y los derechos humanos.
La tercera definición del Dr. Sapolinski equipara "nación" con "estado", como ejemplifica la Constitución Argentina, nos dice. Sin embargo, el Dr. Sapolinski no reconoce que esta visión se alinea con la definición legal internacional ampliamente aceptada de "nación" y "estado". Simplemente menciona, de manera incidental, que Argentina usa esta definición. Aquí encontramos la verdadera definición de nación, pero se le proporciona solo unas pocas frases en el artículo.
Por último, el Dr. Sapolinski propone una definición de nación como una entidad o concepto que encarna la soberanía, como se refleja en la Constitución de Uruguay de 1830. Esta definición lleva a una digresión histórica, tocando el trabajo de la Asamblea Nacional Francesa en 1789 y el debate sobre la soberanía durante el golpe de Gabriel Terra, que, aunque informativo, se desvía del tema central de los derechos de los ciudadanos legales y la definición internacionalmente reconocida de "nacional".
III. La desviación del Dr. Sapolinski al no abordar las definiciones legales internacionales de “nacional” y las implicaciones no exploradas de sus cuatro definiciones de “nación”
A pesar de que el tema central del artículo sea los derechos de los ciudadanos legales en Uruguay, la discusión del Dr. Sapolinski se desvía significativamente, fallando en abordar la definición legal internacional de 'nacional' o los derechos de cualquier ciudadano. El Dr. Sapolinski parece utilizar este rodeo para sentar las bases para afirmar la falta de una definición uniforme de "nación" en el derecho internacional. Sin embargo, en lugar de abordar este problema fundamental directamente, introduce cuatro interpretaciones novedosas de "nación", dejando sin explorar su relevancia para la definición de "nacionalidad" en el derecho internacional y nacional.
Consideremos estos resúmenes de definiciones proporcionadas para "nación" por el Dr. Sapolinski:
El Dr. Sapolinski sugiere que podríamos ver al estado como la nación, pero describe al "estado" principalmente como un mecanismo administrativo para una nación. Sugiere que los estados, si se consideran naciones, podrían luchar para fomentar un sentido de "singularidad cultural" que engendra la identidad nacional. El Dr. Sapolinski claramente duda que un estado pueda cohesionarse suficientemente para formar una nación. Su duda parece fuera de lugar. Su visión de que los "estados" no pueden ser naciones con un sentido de nacionalismo parece pasar por alto ejemplos como los Estados Unidos, donde se evidencia un fuerte sentido de identidad nacional.
El Dr. Sapolinski luego revisa una definición de "nación" basada en la etnicidad, citando "características comunes" de apariencia, pero no logra distanciar este concepto de sus controvertidas asociaciones históricas con la eugenesia y las ideologías fascistas.
En su tercera definición, el Dr. Sapolinski sorprendentemente usa "nacionalidad" para definir "nación", pero lo hace de manera circular. Declara que la nacionalidad es "lugar de nacimiento" y luego usa esa definición como base de nación. Esta interpretación simplista basada en el lugar de nacimiento carece de sustento y no se alinea con las complejas realidades de las normas internacionales y los derechos de ciudadanía.
Por último, define "nación" basándose en el nacionalismo, un concepto a menudo entrelazado con ideologías y supremacía. Sin embargo, el artículo no se involucra críticamente con los aspectos problemáticos del nacionalismo, en su lugar lo retrata como un fenómeno social unificador. La mayoría de los eruditos modernos no creen que el nacionalismo, una expresión de supremacía nacional basada en ideología o características, sea una fuerza positiva en el entorno político actual y esperaría que el Dr. Sapolinski estuviera de acuerdo con ese consenso.
La siguiente sección del artículo es bastante peculiar. En un seminario supuestamente sobre nacionalidad y los derechos de los ciudadanos, el Dr. Sapolinski opta por no explorar la definición de nacional. En cambio, el Dr. Sapolinski encuentra cada ocurrencia de la palabra "nación" y sitúa su uso en contexto. Esta parte de la exposición es adecuada para lo que intenta, pero no tiene ninguna relevancia para el concepto de quién es un "nacional" de Uruguay. De hecho, todos los nacionales de Uruguay son miembros de la "nación", y, a menos que el uso de la palabra "nación" de alguna manera indique quién es un nacional, el uso de la palabra nación por sí sola es irrelevante. Dejando de lado la preocupación sobre si el uso de la palabra "nación" en la Constitución es significativo, podemos reformular la conclusión del Dr. Sapolinski. En general, concluye que la Constitución uruguaya actual usa la palabra nación para significar tres conceptos separados. Esos tres conceptos para nación son, primero, el titular de la soberanía, segundo, una comunidad organizada y tercero, el propio estado.
IV. La interpretación del Dr. Sapolinski de la constitución y la cuestionable afirmación con respecto al artículo 74
Con la sección que meticulosamente rastrea el uso de la palabra "nación" en la Constitución ya analizada, el artículo finalmente llega a un análisis muy breve del uso de la palabra "nacional" en la Constitución. Gran parte del texto es innecesario, ya que observa el uso de la palabra como adjetivo, como en "tesorería nacional". Tal vez este uso adjetival sea interesante, pero es irrelevante para determinar quién es nacional en Uruguay.
Hay un tratamiento muy breve del uso de la palabra nacional en lo que se refiere a individuos. Yo llamaría esto el "corazón" del trabajo. Si es el argumento central, se refiere a una afirmación asombrosa sobre el Artículo 74 de la Constitución. El Dr. Sapolinski afirma que la "nacionalidad" se encuentra en el Artículo 74 de la actual Constitución Uruguaya:
En el artículo 74, cuando se menciona la calidad de padre o madre orientales como requisito para el otorgamiento de la ciudadanía natural a sus hijos, cualquiera haya sido el lugar de nacimiento, condicionado al hecho de que se avecinen en el país y se inscriban en el Registro Cívico.
El Artículo 74 no dice tal cosa. No tiene nada que ver con el concepto de nacionalidad. No utiliza la palabra nacional. De hecho, el único concepto que menciona es la ciudadanía natural. Aquí está el Artículo 74.
Artículo 74. Ciudadanos naturales son todos los hombres y mujeres nacidos en cualquier punto del territorio de la República. Son también ciudadanos naturales los hijos de padre o madre orientales, cualquiera haya sido el lugar de su nacimiento, por el hecho de avecinarse en el país e inscribirse en el Registro Cívico.
El Artículo 81 de la actual Constitución sí utiliza la palabra "nacionalidad". El Artículo 81 establece que un ciudadano natural no pierde la nacionalidad si se naturaliza en otra nación. El Dr. Sapolinski menciona esto, de pasada. Mientras que el Artículo 81, en mi argumento, no significa que los ciudadanos legales no sean nacionales, es probablemente la única cláusula en la Constitución que debería haber sido objeto de discusión en todo el artículo. Merece ser interpretada si supuestamente es la base para negar la nacionalidad a los ciudadanos legales. Pero no encontramos nada sobre el tema en el artículo.
V. Criticando las afirmaciones del Dr. Sapolinski y promoviendo una interpretación más inclusiva de la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía
Las dos últimas páginas del artículo del Dr. Sapolinski nos brindan sus opiniones personales sobre la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía, con una sola cita a la opinión de 1946 de Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. El Dr. Sapolinski se siente libre de inyectar opiniones extralegales y no textuales, aparentemente, sin referenciar significados históricos, porque “la regulación constitucional de la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía es confusa”. Luego afirma, “Un par de conceptos, aunque no expresados claramente, están explícita o implícitamente consagrados en la Constitución”.
Aquí están los conceptos “explícitos” o "implícitos" que el Dr. Sapolinski cree están consagrados en la Constitución:
La Constitución Uruguaya tiene un concepto de quién es un "nacional".
Encontramos la mera afirmación del Dr. Sapolinski de que "el significado natural y obvio de 'nacional' se refiere a una persona nacida en el territorio".
El ejercicio de "derechos ciudadanos", tanto naturales como legales, está condicionado a establecerse en el territorio y cumplir con el requisito de registro en el Registro Cívico Nacional.
Nacional y ciudadano natural no son sinónimos en Uruguay, sino "situaciones diferentes a las que se accede cumpliendo requisitos idénticos".
Basándose solo en Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, el Dr. Sapolinski concluye, "la calidad de nacional depende, por lo tanto, de un hecho, el nacimiento dentro del territorio del Estado". Basándose en esta débil base, se siente cómodo al afirmar que, "La adquisición de la ciudadanía legal no confiere la nacionalidad Oriental", aunque el ciudadano legal participe en el ejercicio de la soberanía, y esta exista "radicalmente en la Nación".
Mi escepticismo persiste. Cualquier académico jurídico comprometido con la meticulosa aplicación de los métodos interpretativos constitucionales uruguayos debería compartir este escepticismo. Los argumentos del Dr. Sapolinski no logran abordar, y mucho menos refutar, la definición internacional de “nacionalidad” y su aplicación en tratados. Cuando se basan únicamente en la opinión subjetiva, las visiones parroquiales de académicos uruguayos individuales no logran tener poder persuasivo en un contexto global.
Esta línea de razonamiento defectuosa lleva a una conclusión absurda y tautológica. El Dr. Sapolinski, utilizando estos débiles argumentos, parece decidido a excluir a los ciudadanos legales, particularmente a los inmigrantes, del concepto de nacionalidad uruguaya. Tal exclusión no solo los saca del abrazo protector de la nación, sino que también les niega un papel en la configuración del futuro colectivo de Uruguay y en la participación en su vida cívica. Justifica esta exclusión afirmando que representa “la práctica habitual entre los países”, una afirmación que carece de fundamento y parece más una afirmación de creencia personal que un reflejo de normas o prácticas legales reales.
El Dr. Sapolinski lo expresa así:
La nacionalidad es considerada como un manto protector a los compatriotas que corresponde al Estado. ¿Cuál es la fuente de ello? La práctica habitual entre los países. Como punto de conexión la nacionalidad se erige en un marco para la participación en el destino colectivo y por eso se le reconoce el derecho de participar, en calidad de ciudadano, de la vida cívica de su país. El concepto de ciudadanía, por su parte, apunta al ejercicio de los derechos y deberes cívicos.
Sus palabras, "la práctica habitual entre los países", quedan sin el respaldo de un análisis legal comparativo o jurisprudencia internacional. Esta retórica, aparentemente arraigada en una interpretación estrecha de la nacionalidad, no se involucra con las definiciones más amplias e inclusivas reconocidas en el derecho internacional. Omite la naturaleza dinámica y evolutiva de la nacionalidad como un concepto que debería abarcar a todos los ciudadanos legales, independientemente de su origen, en el viaje compartido del progreso y enriquecimiento cultural de una nación.
El enfoque del Dr. Sapolinski plantea serias preguntas sobre la inclusividad y equidad de su marco interpretativo. Resalta una preocupante tendencia a apoyarse en puntos de vista subjetivos y potencialmente anticuados, lo que corre el riesgo de marginar segmentos significativos de la población de Uruguay y contradice el espíritu inclusivo de los estándares legales internacionales modernos. Creo que también contradice el espíritu inclusivo y la interpretación auténtica de las Constituciones de Uruguay.
Sin embargo, el Dr. Sapolinski afirma que los ciudadanos legales, extranjeros que han buscado voluntariamente la ciudadanía, deberían ser negados de protección diplomática en el extranjero. Aboga por esta exclusión definiendo "nacional" como un estado vinculado exclusivamente a la protección internacional, perpetuando así una postura discriminatoria sin un respaldo sustancial.
Esta interpretación, no solo carente de respaldo evidencial sino también de citas autoritativas, parece estar arraigada en una serie de puntos de vista anticuados y sesgados. La posición final del Dr. Sapolinski es que el estado de ser extranjero es un "hecho objetivo" que permanece inalterado, independientemente de la ciudadanía legal. Esta afirmación contrasta marcadamente con las visiones de la comunidad legal internacional más amplia, donde tal noción está lejos de considerarse "obvia". El derecho internacional a menudo adopta una postura contraria, enfatizando el respeto a los derechos humanos y la inclusividad en la definición de nacionalidad.
VI. El derecho internacional y sus definiciones de estado, nación y nacional
Examinemos lo que el derecho internacional establece con respecto al estado, la nación y el nacional. Podemos hacerlo con citas. En el derecho internacional, un estado, también llamado nación, comprende cuatro elementos esenciales: un territorio definido, una población permanente, un gobierno y una capacidad para llevar a cabo relaciones internacionales.[1] Un estado soberano puede administrar libremente su población en su territorio y establecer su política exterior. En un texto del siglo XVIII, Emer de Vattel definió a las naciones o estados como "cuerpos políticos, sociedades de hombres que se han unido y combinado sus fuerzas, para procurar su bienestar mutuo y sociedad". Agregó: "Toda nación que se gobierna a sí misma, bajo cualquier forma, y que no depende de ninguna otra nación, es un estado soberano".[2]
El estado uruguayo, del cual los ciudadanos legales son parte de la soberanía, es considerado, en el derecho internacional y los tratados, como la nación de Uruguay. Las definiciones internas, domésticas o municipales son irrelevantes para las obligaciones de estado a estado, como las de los tratados sobre apatridia.
La nacionalidad tiene un significado claro en el derecho internacional que atraviesa todas las explicaciones elaboradas en el artículo del Dr. Sapolinski. "La nacionalidad define la relación legal o 'vínculo legal' entre el ciudadano/nacional y su estado". Además, "esta relación se basa en hechos sociales de apego y da lugar a derechos y deberes por parte de ambos lados de esa relación".[3] La Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) en el caso Nottebohm indicó que "La nacionalidad es un vínculo legal que tiene como base un hecho social de apego, una conexión genuina de existencia, interés y sentimientos, junto con la existencia de derechos y deberes recíprocos".[4] De esto se desprende que la nacionalidad se determina por los lazos sociales de una persona con una nación, también llamada estado. Una vez establecidos, esos lazos dan lugar a derechos y deberes por parte del estado, así como por parte del nacional, quien también, en el derecho internacional, se llama ciudadano.
No encontramos mención del lugar de nacimiento en estos materiales internacionales. Las definiciones étnicas anticuadas han sido dejadas de lado. Lo que es considerado "obvio" para el Dr. Sapolinski ni siquiera merece mención en las decisiones y textos internacionales modernos.
Contradiciendo aún más la afirmación del Dr. Sapolinski está el estimado jurista uruguayo Alberto Pérez Pérez, cuyas contribuciones a la erudición legal y la defensa de los derechos humanos presentan una perspectiva más ilustrada y humana. Pérez Pérez, un respetado abogado, activista de derechos humanos y exdecano de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de la República, se desempeñó como juez en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Sus opiniones e interpretaciones legales contrastan marcadamente con las opiniones más limitadas del Dr. Sapolinski.
El Dr. Pérez Pérez elaboró su creencia de que la Constitución de Uruguay no indicaba que los ciudadanos legales fueran extranjeros en 1995. De hecho, el título de su artículo es Los Ciudadanos Legales no son Extranjeros. Aquí hay un extracto:
Como se expuso al principio a nuestro juicio los conceptos de nacionalidad y ciudadanía son idénticos (o coinciden plenamente), al menos en un Estado democrático como la República Oriental del Uruguay. En consecuencia, todos los ciudadanos (es decir, tanto los legales como los naturales) forman, en conjunto, una categoría que se opone a la de extranjeros.[5]
Para un examen exhaustivo de la Constitución Uruguaya, sus disposiciones sobre la nacionalidad y las prácticas e comunicaciones históricas de Uruguay que desafían los puntos de vista del Dr. Sapolinski, remito a los lectores a mi reciente publicación, “La Interpretación Constitucional de la Nacionalidad Uruguaya Según la Metodología Constitucional Uruguaya”, publicada en el volumen 29 del ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, página 443, en 2023. Ese artículo incluye muchas visiones alternativas que permiten interpretaciones razonables de la Constitución.
En conclusión, abogo firmemente por un enfoque basado en el rigor académico en lugar de la opinión subjetiva. Me alineo con los estándares ejemplares establecidos por Alberto Pérez Pérez, cuya erudición representa el pináculo de la investigación legal sobre la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía en Uruguay. Estoy de acuerdo con las definiciones internacionales directas de nación y nacional. Este enfoque rechaza las afirmaciones simplistas sobre lo que es “obvio” y “objetivo”, favoreciendo un análisis minucioso y matizado basado en la ley y la historia.
[1] Véase la Convención sobre Derechos y Deberes de los Estados, art. 1, 49 Stat. W. Janis 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (realizada en Montevideo el 26 de diciembre de 1933; entró en vigor el 26 de diciembre de 1934).
[2] E, de Vattel, The Law of Nations 3-4, 11 (1758 ed. Fenwick trans. 1919).
[3] Edwards, A. (2014). The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights. In A. Edwards & L. van Waas (Eds.), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law. Cambridge University Press.
[4] Caso Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Segunda Fase, Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ), 6 de abril de 1955, Informes de la CIJ 1955, p. 4; Lista General, No. 18.
[5] Pérez Pérez, Alberto. "Los ciudadanos legales no son extranjeros." LJU Tomo 111, 297. Cita Online: UY/DOC/765/2009.
Challenging Traditional Notions of Nationality: A Critical Review of Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretations and Advocating for a Modern Legal Framework in Uruguay
In the realm of legal scholarship, precision, and adherence to internationally accepted standards are not merely ideals but necessities. This essay critically examines the work of Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski contained in his article on "nationality," published in the Revista de Derecho Constitucional, entitled Nación, Nacionalidad y Estado en el Marco Institucional Uruguayo. Dr. Sapolinski notably fails to engage with the crucial historical and human rights dimensions inherent to the concept of nationality. Instead of offering a rigorous legal analysis, his approach veers towards outdated, philosophical, and parochial perspectives that fall short of the demands of modern international law and human rights principles. He also fails to apply accepted methods of Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology to Article 81 of the Constitution.
This critique underscores the imperative need for legal scholarship, especially in a legal system like Uruguay's, which lacks definitive judicial interpretations, to align with globally recognized definitions and human rights principles. Legal scholarship must transcend subjective interpretations and local views to embrace a historically informed and rights-conscious methodology. In challenging Dr. Sapolinski's various definitions of "nation" and "nationality," this reply advocates for a more legally robust and inclusive interpretation of these terms, consistent with international norms and respectful of the rights of all citizens, including immigrants.
This response to Dr. Sapolinski is not merely a critique of a fellow scholar's work but a call for academic rigor and a commitment to uphold the integrity of international legal standards in interpreting constitutional provisions related to nationality in Uruguay. It is a pursuit to honor the legacy of esteemed jurists like Alberto Pérez Pérez, advocating for a legal scholarship that bridges the gap between national interpretations and international obligations, thereby ensuring that our understanding of nationality remains firmly rooted in the broader context of human rights and global legal consensus.
I. Critique of Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretive Approach and Its Deviation from the Intended Focus
In his article, Dr. Sapolinski, a distinguished professor of Constitutional Law at the University of the Republic, regrettably overlooks both the historical evolution and the significant human rights implications of a narrowly construed definition of “nationality” — a stance often adopted by a segment of Uruguayan legal scholars. Dr. Sapolinski’s article did not need its included analysis of various eighteenth and nineteenth-century philosophers, but it would have benefitted from an incorporation of international legal norms.
The essence of law is its capacity to define terminology and concepts with precision, facilitating their practical application within a society governed by laws. The paramount duty of legal scholars, particularly in a system such as Uruguay's, bereft of definitive judicial interpretations, is to furnish interpretations of laws and constitutional provisions that best reflect their true intent and scope. Exceptional legal scholarship cannot afford to be marred by philosophical diversions, arguing that meanings are malleable and influenced by individual experiences, educational backgrounds, ideologies, beliefs, or vested interests.
This principle of careful and internationally-accepted scholarship gains even greater significance when the scholarly endeavor involves deciphering the international usage of terms and phrases found in customary international law — the law universally acknowledged and applicable — as well as in treaty-based commitments. International legal terminologies possess defined meanings. When Uruguay ratifies a treaty, exerting its sovereign rights as sanctioned by its Constitution, it implicitly endorses the international meanings of terms employed in the treaty. Should Uruguay dissent from these internationally accepted interpretations, it retains the prerogative to either abstain from ratifying the treaty or express its reservations explicitly.
In his article, Dr. Sapolinski does articulate a general framework for constitutional interpretation in Uruguay. He posits that such interpretation should initially hinge on the text's literal meaning. Where this literal interpretation proves inadequate, one must then turn to the explicit intent of the legislation or its historical context for clarity. The natural and apparent meaning of words is preferred, barring instances where the legislation assigns a different definition, in cases involving technical jargon superseding the apparent interpretation, or when a term is distinctly defined for legislative purposes.
Yet, the article notably falls short of specifying which constitutional articles Dr. Sapolinski purports to interpret. It fails to address the central theme of the Taller Seminar, the workshop, in which the paper was first presented. That workshop was organized to analyze legal citizenship through the lens of rights. Instead, Dr. Sapolinski’s paper deviates into an exploration of the linguistic nuances and historical contexts of terms like “nation” and “nationality,” thus straying from its intended focus.
II. Examining Dr. Sapolinski's Multiple Definitions of "Nation" and Their Implications
Setting aside the paper's omission of a discussion on the rights of legal citizens in Uruguay, and despite the fact that was the topic of the workshop in which it was delivered, an analysis of what Dr. Sapolinski's work purports to achieve is warranted.
Dr. Sapolinski's discourse begins by outlining four potential linguistic interpretations of the term “nation.” The first definition is based on ethnicity. It is somewhat surprising that Dr. Sapolinski includes an ethnicity-based definition among his definitions. This perspective, which attributes nationhood to unique structural elements like physical traits, biological characteristics, cultural features, or even clothing, seems anachronistic for a twenty-first-century legal analysis. Historically, such a definition found favor in certain European circles during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it has since been widely discredited as a viable concept of nationhood.
Further complicating matters, Dr. Sapolinski's narrative swiftly diverges from a discussion of the rights of legal citizens to a conflation of “nationality” with the ideological doctrine of “nationalism.” This conflation becomes evident through his reliance on a 2018 publication by Iván Romero on the history of nationalism. Intriguingly, Dr. Sapolinski does not outright reject this ethnic-centric view of a nation. Romero explains that ethnic-based nationalism draws support from the controversial work of Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, author of Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853-1855). Instead of rejecting or just omitting such a justification, Dr. Sapolinski presents it as a theoretical possibility for defining “nation,” using it as a steppingstone to discuss Uruguay's conception of “nation.”
Dr. Sapolinski argues that Uruguay rejects ethnic nationality, citing its “inclusive” approach to what is the “nation” because Uruguay incorporates into the nation the “offspring” (at least those born in Uruguay) of diverse ethnic groups. Second generation Uruguayans include, for example, Armenians, Afro-Descendants, and Spanish or Italian immigrants. He calls such “offspring” Orientals. However, this explanation quickly shifts focus and loses persuasiveness, simply introducing a new ethnic category, termed “Oriental,” thus bypassing the core issue, and obviously forecloses the opportunity for legal citizens to be Oriental.
The second definition provided by Dr. Sapolinski labels “nation” as an anthropological concept. He suggests that nationhood is formed through shared cultural elements like language, historical traditions, customs, symbols, and mythical narratives. This perspective draws support, according to Dr. Sapolinski, from the nineteenth-century thinker Ernest Renan, who has been subject to considerable critique in modern times for his deterministic views on racial characteristics and his contentious opinions on the Semitic “race.” Anthropological conceptions of nation are generally benign, but they fail to allow for multiple traditions to be incorporated into one nation.
While Dr. Sapolinski references Renan's more inclusive definition of a nation as a collective that aspires to live and achieve together, this interpretation is overshadowed by Renan's controversial legacy. Renan’s work does not align neatly with contemporary understandings of nationhood in modern international law and human rights.
Dr. Sapolinski's third definition equates “nation” with “state,” as the Argentine Constitution exemplifies, he tells us. However, Dr. Sapolinski neglects to acknowledge that this view aligns with the widely accepted international legal definition of “nation” and “state.” He simply mentions, in an offhand way, that Argentina uses this definition. Here we find the true definition of nation, but it is provided only a few sentences in the article.
Lastly, Dr. Sapolinski proposes a definition of a nation as an entity or concept embodying sovereignty, as reflected in Uruguay's 1830 Constitution. This definition leads to a historical digression, touching upon the French National Assembly's work in 1789 and the debate over sovereignty during Gabriel Terra's coup, which, while informative, strays from the central topic of the rights of legal citizens and the internationally recognized definition of “national.”
III. Dr. Sapolinski's Divergence from Addressing International Legal Definitions of 'National' and the Unexplored Implications of His Four 'Nation' Definitions
Despite the article's central theme being the rights of legal citizens in Uruguay, Dr. Sapolinski's discussion strays significantly, failing to address the international legal definition of 'national' or the rights of any citizens. Dr. Sapolinski appears to use this detour to lay the groundwork for asserting the lack of a uniform definition of “nation” in international law. However, instead of addressing this fundamental issue directly, he introduces four novel interpretations of “nation,” leaving their relevance to the definition of “nationality” in international and domestic law unexplored.
Let's consider these summaries of definitions provided for “nation” by Dr. Sapolinski:
Dr. Sapolinski suggests that we might see the state as the nation, but he describes the “state” as primarily an administrative mechanism for a nation. He suggests that states, if considered nations, might struggle to foster a sense of “cultural uniqueness” that engenders national identity. Dr. Sapolinski clearly doubts that a state can sufficiently cohere to form a nation. His doubt seems misplaced. His view that “states” cannot be nations with a sense of nationalism seemingly overlooks examples like the United States, where a strong sense of national identity is evident.
Dr. Sapolinski next revisits an ethnically based definition of “nation,” citing “common characteristics” of appearance, yet he fails to distance this concept from its controversial historical associations with eugenics and fascist ideologies.
In his third definition, Dr. Sapolinski surprisingly uses “nationality” to define “nation,” but does so in a circular manner. He declares that nationality is “place of birth” and then uses that definition as the basis of nation. This simplistic interpretation based on place of birth lacks substantiation and fails to align with the complex realities of international norms and citizenship rights.
Lastly, he defines “nation” based on nationalism, a concept often intertwined with ideologies and supremacy. However, the article does not critically engage with the problematic aspects of nationalism, instead portraying it as a unifying social phenomenon. Most modern scholars do not believe that nationalism, an expression of national supremacy based on ideology or characteristics, is a positive force in the current political environment and I would expect Dr. Sapolinski to agree with that consensus.
The next section of the article is rather peculiar. In a seminar allegedly concerning nationality and the rights of citizens, Dr. Sapolinski opts not to explore the definition of national. Instead, Dr. Sapolinski finds each occurrence of the word “nation” and places its use in context. This part of the exposition is adequate for what it attempts, but it has no bearing on the concept of who is a “national” of Uruguay. Indeed, all nationals of Uruguay are members of the “nation,” and, unless the use of the word “nation” somehow indicates who is a national, the use of the word nation by itself is beside the point. Putting the concern about whether the use of the word “nation” in the Constitution is meaningful, we can restate Dr. Sapolinski’s conclusion. Overall, he concludes that the current Uruguayan Constitution uses the word nation to signify three separate concepts. Those three concepts for nation are, first, the holder of sovereignty, second, an organized community, and third, the state itself.
IV. Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretation of the Constitution and the Questionable Assertion Regarding Article 74
With the section meticulously tracing the use of the word “nation” in the Constitution behind us, the article finally arrives at a very short analysis of the use of the word “national” in the Constitution. Most of the text is unnecessary, because it looks at the use of the word as an adjective, as in “national treasury.” Perhaps this adjectival use is interesting, but it is irrelevant to who in Uruguay is a national.
There is a very short treatment of the use of the word national as it applies to individuals. I would call this the “heart” of the paper. If it is the core argument, it concerns an astounding claim about Article 74 of the Constitution. Dr. Sapolinski states “nationality” is found in Article 74 of the current Uruguayan Constitution:
In Article 74, when mentioning the status of Oriental father or mother as a requirement for granting natural citizenship to their children, regardless of the place of birth, conditioned upon settling in the country and registering in the Civic Registry.
Article 74 says no such thing. It has nothing to do with the concept of nationality. It does not use the word national. In fact, the only concept it mentions is natural citizenship. Here is Article 74.
Article 74. All men and women born at any place within the territory of the Republic are natural citizens. Children of Uruguayan fathers or mothers are also natural citizens, wherever they may have been born, provided that they take up residence in the country and register themselves in the Civil Register.
Article 81 of the current Constitution does, in contrast, use the word “nationality.” Article 81 states that nationality is not lost by a natural citizen if they naturalize in another nation. Dr. Sapolinski does mention this, in passing. While Article 81, in my argument, does not mean legal citizens are not nationals, it is likely the only clause in the Constitution that should have been subject to discussion in the entire article. It is worthy of being interpreted if it is allegedly the basis for denying nationality to legal citizens. But we find nothing on the topic in the article.
V. Critiquing Dr. Sapolinski's Assertions and Promoting a More Inclusive Interpretation of Nationality and Citizenship
The final two pages of Dr. Sapolinski’s article provide us with his personal opinions on nationality and citizenship, with a citation only to the 1946 opinion of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. Dr. Sapolinski feels free to inject extralegal and non-textual opinions, apparently, without referencing historical meanings, because “the constitutional regulation of nationality and citizenship is confusing.” He then states, “A couple of concepts, though not clearly expressed, are expressly or implicitly enshrined in the Constitution.”
Here are the “express” or "implicit" concepts Dr. Sapolinski believes are enshrined in the Constitution:
The Uruguayan Constitution has a concept of who is a "national."
We find the bare assertion by Dr. Sapolinski that "the natural and obvious meaning of 'national' refers to a person born in the territory."
The exercise of "citizen rights," both natural and legal, is conditioned on settling in the territory and fulfilling the registration requirement in the National Civic Registry.
National and natural citizen are not synonyms in Uruguay but are "different situations accessed by fulfilling identical requirements."
Based only on Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, Dr. Sapolinski concludes, "the quality of national depends, therefore, on a fact, birth within the territory of the State." Based on this flimsy reed, he is comfortable to state that, "The acquisition of legal citizenship does not confer Oriental nationality," even though the legal citizen participates in the exercise of sovereignty, and this exists "radically in the Nation."
My skepticism persists. Any legal scholar committed to the meticulous application of Uruguayan constitutional interpretive methods should share this skepticism. Dr. Sapolinski's arguments fall short of addressing, let alone refuting, the international definition of “nationality” and its application in treaties. When grounded solely in subjective opinion, the parochial views of individual Uruguayan academicians fail to hold persuasive power in a global context.
This flawed line of reasoning leads to a nonsensical and tautological conclusion. Dr. Sapolinski, utilizing these weak arguments, appears intent on excluding legal citizens, particularly immigrants, from the concept of Uruguayan nationality. Such exclusion not only removes them from the protective embrace of the nation but also denies them a role in shaping Uruguay's collective future and participating in its civic life. He justifies this exclusion by stating it represents “the usual practice among countries,” a claim that lacks substantiation and seems more an assertion of personal belief than a reflection of actual legal norms or practices.
Dr. Sapolinski puts it like this:
Nationality is considered a protective mantle for compatriots, corresponding to the state. The source of this is the usual practice among countries. As a point of connection, nationality is established as a framework for participation in the collective destiny, thus recognizing the right to participate, as a citizen, in the civic life of one's country. On the other hand, the concept of citizenship refers to exercising civic rights and duties.
His words, “the usual practice among countries,” stand without the support of comparative legal analysis or international jurisprudence. This rhetoric, seemingly rooted in a narrow interpretation of nationality, does not engage with the broader, more inclusive definitions recognized in international law. It neglects the dynamic and evolving nature of nationality as a concept that should encompass all legal citizens, irrespective of their origin, in the shared journey of a nation's progress and cultural enrichment.
Dr. Sapolinski's approach raises serious questions about the inclusivity and fairness of his interpretative framework. It highlights a concerning tendency to lean on subjective and potentially outdated viewpoints, which risks marginalizing significant segments of Uruguay's population and contradicts the inclusive spirit of modern international legal standards. I believe it contradicts Uruguay's Constitutions' inclusive spirit and authentic interpretation.
Dr. Sapolinski nevertheless asserts that legal citizens, foreigners who have voluntarily sought citizenship, should be denied diplomatic protection abroad. He advocates for this exclusion by defining “national” as a status linked exclusively to international protection, thereby perpetuating a discriminatory stance without substantial support.
This interpretation, not only lacking in evidential backing but also devoid of authoritative citations, seems to be rooted in a series of outdated and biased viewpoints. Dr. Sapolinski's final position is that the status of being a foreigner is an “objective fact” that remains unaltered, regardless of legal citizenship. This assertion starkly contrasts with the broader international legal community's views, where such a notion is far from considered “obvious.” International law often takes a contrary stance, emphasizing respect for human rights and inclusivity in defining nationality.
VI. International Law and Its Definitions of State, Nation, and National
Let us examine what international law provides concerning state, nation, and national. We can do so with citations. In international law, a state, also called a nation, comprises four essential elements: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a capacity to conduct international relations.[1] A sovereign state can freely administer its population in its territory and set its foreign policy. In an eighteenth-century text, Emer de Vattel defined nations or states as "political bodies, societies of men who have united together and combined their forces, to procure their mutual welfare and society." He added, "Every nation which governs itself, under whatever form, and which does not depend on any other nation, is a sovereign state."[2]
The Uruguayan state, of which legal citizens are a part of the sovereignty, is considered, in international law and treaties, to be the nation of Uruguay. Internal, domestic, or municipal definitions are irrelevant for state-to-state obligations, such as those in statelessness treaties.
Nationality has a plain meaning in international law that cuts through all of the elaborate explanations in Dr. Sapolinski's article. "Nationality defines the legal relationship or 'legal bond' between the citizen/national and her state." Further, "this relationship is based on social facts of attachment and gives rise to rights and duties on the part of both sides of that relationship."[3] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case indicated that "Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest, and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."[4] From this, it is evident that nationality is determined by one's social ties to a nation, also called a state. When established, those ties give rise to rights and duties on the part of the state, as well as on the part of the national, who is also, in international law, called a citizen.
We find no mention of birth in these international materials. Outdated ethnic definitions have been cast aside. What is considered “obvious” to Dr. Sapolinski does not even merit mention in modern international decisions and texts.
Further contradicting Dr. Sapolinski's claim is the esteemed Uruguayan jurist Alberto Pérez Pérez, whose contributions to legal scholarship and human rights advocacy present a more enlightened and humane perspective. Pérez Pérez, a respected lawyer, human rights activist, and former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic, served as a judge on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. His views and legal interpretations starkly contrast to the more limited opinions of Dr. Sapolinski.
Dr. Pérez Pérez elaborated on his belief that the Constitution of Uruguay did not indicate legal citizens were foreigners in 1995. The title of his article, in fact, is Legal Citizens are not Foreigners. Here is an excerpt:
As stated at the beginning, in my opinion, the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical (or fully coincide), at least in a democratic State such as the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners.[5]
For a comprehensive examination of the Uruguayan Constitution, its provisions concerning nationality, and Uruguay's historical practices and communications that challenge Dr. Sapolinski's viewpoints, I refer readers to my recent publication, “The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology,” published in the 29th volume of the ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, page 443, in 2023. That article includes many alternative views allowing for reasonable interpretations of the Constitution.
In conclusion, I firmly advocate for an approach grounded in academic rigor rather than subjective opinion. I align myself with the exemplary standards set by Alberto Pérez Pérez, whose scholarship represents the pinnacle of legal inquiry into nationality and citizenship in Uruguay. I stand with the straightforward international definitions of nation and national. This approach rejects simplistic assertions about what is “obvious” and “objective,” favoring a thorough and nuanced analysis based on law and history.
[1] See the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. W. Janis 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (done at Montevideo December 26, 1933; entered into force December 26, 1934.
[2] E, de Vattel, The Law of Nations 3-4, 11 (1758 ed. Fenwick trans. 1919).
[3] Edwards, A. (2014). The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights. In A. Edwards & L. van Waas (Eds.), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law. Cambridge University Press.
[4] Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 April 1955, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4; General List, No. 18.
[5] Pérez Pérez, Alberto. "Los ciudadanos legales no son extranjeros." LJU Tomo 111, 297. Cita Online: UY/DOC/765/2009.
Dr. Darío Burstin Explains Problems with Uruguayan Nationality Interpretation on Radio Sarandí
I thank Radio Sarandí (Informativo Sarandí) for providing a forum for the topic of Uruguayan nationality and citizenship policies and fostering discourse in Uruguay on this crucial matter. I also thank Dr. Burstin for his accurate and insightful analysis of the issue. Dr. Burstin, as a legislative advisor for the Frente Amplio, addresses the topic with depth, understanding, and historical context.
An unofficial transcript, translated into English, is provided below.
The complete interview in Spanish is available at Radio Sarandí at the following link.
http://audios.sarandi690.com.uy/sarandi/diariosarandi/DiarioSarandi_240103.mp3
Unofficial Transcript
Informativo Sarandí
Interviewer: We greet Dr. Darío Burstin this morning here at Informativo Sarandí. Darío, welcome.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here this morning.
Interviewer: Well, Dr. Darío Burstin represents foreigners with Uruguayan citizenship who have been complaining for a long time now that their passports are not recognized as Uruguayan citizens despite having citizenship, and as a result, they face several problems. Among those problems, for example, are difficulties in entering other countries.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly.
Interviewer: What is this situation about? How can a person who has obtained Uruguayan citizenship not be recognized as a Uruguayan? What’s happening here?
Dr. Darío Burstin: Good morning; thank you very much. First, a brief statement. I address this issue as a legislative advisor for the Frente Amplio. I do not represent the organizations advocating for this matter, but I have an excellent relationship with them and believe their claim is absolutely fair. Two law projects are currently underway to try to solve this issue. I did not work directly in their original drafting. I was not aware of the issue, but when I became aware of it, as it relates to issues I have studied, it became a topic of interest to me.
The situation is as follows.
In Uruguay, as most of the listeners probably know, our Constitution provides for two types of citizens. Natural citizens, who are basically those born in Uruguay and children of Uruguayans born abroad. Plus, there is a law that extends this to grandchildren, a somewhat more recent law. And legal citizens, who are basically immigrants, people born abroad (not as children of Uruguayans, who come to live in Uruguay) spend a certain number of years, meet requirements, apply for citizenship, and are granted it. I am the grandson of four legal citizens, now deceased. Surely, many of us in Uruguay also have this background.
Interviewer: Exactly.
Dr. Darío Burstin: That's why, at one time, legal citizens represented a very significant proportion of the Uruguayan population. What is the issue? Until 1994, Uruguayan passports stated that the holder of that passport was a natural citizen or a legal Uruguayan citizen. And with that, Uruguayan legal citizens had no problem entering other countries. Starting in 1994, Uruguay began a process of changing the format of passports to a standardized format. You see, before 1994, the Uruguayan passport had some unique aspects, but such differences were more acceptable. There was minimal international standardization of passports, and they were not all the same for all nations. From 1994 onwards, the format began to change.
Interviewer: And what happens then?
Dr. Darío Burstin: The international format of passports does not have a field that says “citizenship,” as our historical passports did, but the field says “nationality,” using another word. So why should that matter? Here in Uruguay, in the world of constitutional law, there is a historical position, a peculiar historical interpretation of the Constitution, that says that Uruguay distinguishes between nationals and citizens. And this is a topic that, if we were to delve into it, becomes very complex and abstract. But broadly speaking, the issue is as follows. Historically, some countries have classified two different types of “links” to a nation, one called national and one called citizen. In some cases, the nationals were those born in the country, or the historical descendants of people born in the country. We might call this a category of people belonging to a particular ethnicity. And then there were citizens — these are people who could participate in the political life of the country, they had the right to vote, to be elected, etc.
Here in Uruguay, what did we do at our founding? Our Constitution never made that distinction. It only speaks of citizens. So how did this change into what it is now? A very respected historical constitutional law professor (a very lucid man as well) believed that since the Constitution did not define which citizens were nationals or who were nationals at all, we, as interpreters, had to fix that omission of the Constitution. He then interprets, at least initially, that natural citizens (those born in Uruguay and children of Uruguayans born abroad) are the nationals of Uruguay, and he states that legal citizens are not nationals; they are only citizens.
According to this interpretation of the Constitution, Uruguay would be, to this day, the only country in the world that does not naturalize immigrants. That is, Uruguay is the one and only nation with this situation. I have not been able to find any other country that does not provide for what is called naturalization, which is the act of nationalizing a foreigner and considering them a national, a member of their national community. It would take a long time to get into the legal discussions of why ...
Interviewer: OK, but I have to ask, how does this play out in real life? What problems does this interpretation generate for legal citizens?
Dr. Darío Burstin: It became more of an issue with the chip in the passport, and it has been almost ten years since that happened. Legal citizens obtain citizenship, they vote, and they are involved. In past times, this distinction between nationality and citizenship was an issue at play in the interpretation of the constitutional law professors, probably the majority of those professors. But, for all intents and purposes, it was a historical practice. For me, before the passport issue, it didn’t generate any visible problems. It was a theoretical, abstract, national matter.
According to this interpretation of the Constitution I mentioned, which I myself do not share, though it is widely accepted in constitutional legal circles, Uruguay has an idiosyncrasy, or a quirk, in its policy and law. This quirk is that for the Uruguayan state, the foreigner who comes and obtains citizenship will always be a foreigner, according to this interpretation of the Constitution.
But the Constitution does not expressly say this in its text. The interpretation of what the Constitution “left out” did not generate any problems and did not go beyond legal discussion for many years. So you might ask, “What happened to change that?”
When Uruguay adapted to emerging international passport formats, and particularly since 2015, when passports started to be exclusively issued with a chip, the passport did not contain any useful location in which to clarify and explain whether the person with the passport was a legal or natural Uruguayan citizen. There wasn’t a place or area that an immigration officer would actually look at to read this. The passport can only say “nationality.” The civil identification division of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted — I mean, reading the constitutional law treatises— they interpreted that if the passport asks for nationality, we cannot say legal citizens are “Uruguayan.” That was the ministries’ interpretation. And through internal manuals, apparently, they came to the conclusion that in that field, Uruguay must put the country of birth. By the way, conceptually, putting the country of birth in this field is also a mistake.
Interviewer: Sure, but I, obviously, from ignorance, but those of us who have, for example, obtained foreign citizenship, if an Uruguayan natural citizen takes an Italian passport, he or she has to apply for citizenship to be granted a passport. How does Uruguay issue a passport to a foreigner? How do you issue a passport to a citizen who is not from your country? Because they have citizenship. Even this is something that is under discussion. It's already wrong from the start.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly, I understand that what is happening here is that we have a confusion between these two concepts.
Interviewer: Now I think I’m understanding all the initial information, right?
Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly. But we come to something completely … It's significant, I mean, if they are not nationals, if the foreigners, even my grandparents, were not nationals.
Interviewer: But how many Uruguayans travel and spend time in the European Union with their Italian or Spanish passports, right? What happens in practice for legal citizens that is different?
Dr. Darío Burstin: In practice, what happens is that legal Uruguayan citizens, immigrants who obtained citizenship in Uruguay, try to travel the world, but they are somewhat at the mercy of immigration officers, as they may or may not be allowed entry into the countries they want to visit depending on the interpretation of the immigration officer. I understand that a foreign immigration officer, when they see a Uruguayan passport that states it's issued by Uruguay, with nationality from Venezuela, Brazil, Spain, or anywhere else, has every right to be confused and not understand what they are dealing with.
With good intentions, as many legal citizens in this situation have explained to me, they sometimes talk to the officers, get delayed, and face an additional problem because nowadays, in many international airports, they go through the standardized machine for “reading.”
What happens when Uruguayan passports are passed through automated systems? These airport machines immediately flag all Uruguayan legal citizen passports as errors, as the machines, and officers, expect the "country of emission" field (that is, the nation issuing a passport) and the nationality field to match. So, legal citizens are left at the discretion of the immigration officer. We have cases of Uruguayans who can't enter countries.
Imagine the scenario of an immigration officer accustomed to automatic processing, the machine gives an error, and they have to go to the counter to explain and understand why the machine gave an error, and they see this Uruguayan passport.
Many officers do not understand, and as I've been told, many Uruguayans have been sent back from trips, legal citizens. In many cases, what they tell me happens is that the airlines, if they allow a person to travel without proper documentation, become responsible for the “illegal entry.” If the person is not allowed to enter the country at immigration after getting off the plane, the airline is responsible for bringing the person back. So, in many cases, the airlines no longer allow them to travel. Passengers about whom the airline employees have any doubts do not get to board the plane. I have seen and even shown cases of legal Uruguayan citizens who tried to enter Brazil, and the immigration officer suspected the passport was fake, denied entry, and invalidated it, placing a cancellation notice.
Interviewer: Ah, that's harsh.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly.
Interviewer: Is there an estimate of how many people might be exposed to this type of situation?
Dr. Darío Burstin: From what I've been told, the legal citizens currently living in these circumstances, well, in the previous generation, there were many more, but now I believe the majority are relatively recent immigrants. According to what I've been told, there are around 35,000 people, and the problems vary greatly. For example, a person who doesn't travel today obviously doesn't have this problem. People who travel to certain countries where immigration authorities, like Argentina, for instance, understand what a Uruguayan passport looks like don't encounter significant issues. Countries that already require a visa for Uruguay, such as the case of the United States, also don't cause problems because they have to apply for the visa, and that document is what matters to them.
Interviewer: Exactly.
Dr. Darío Burstin: So, there is no problem in those cases. However, some people have significant issues, and Uruguay may even be violating international agreements. You see, there are legal Uruguayan citizens who come from countries that do not allow dual nationality.
Interviewer: For example?
Dr. Darío Burstin: For example, India. There's also a case that has been in the news, a person from Tajikistan. However, there are many countries that do not allow dual nationality. It's not something unusual.
Interviewer: What is the problem with other countries' denial of dual nationality?
Dr. Darío Burstin: If a person obtains legal citizenship in Uruguay, Uruguay believes it hasn't granted them nationality. However, the country of origin generally sees Uruguayan legal citizenship as a form of nationality. Because that's how it is in almost the entire world today. Being a citizen and being a national of a country are usually the same thing. Almost everywhere. So, what happens? By losing their original nationality and Uruguay saying it doesn't grant them nationality, that person is left without any nation that recognizes them as a national. They become someone without nationality.
Interviewer: Dr. Burstin, what is the solution to this issue? Is it a legislative matter at the parliamentary level? You've mentioned a couple of projects are underway.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly, there are bills. However, I believe this issue can also be resolved administratively through a simple decision by the Ministry of the Interior, the DNIC (Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil). It can be solved this way because the theoretical construction that denies legal citizens their nationality is an interpretation of the Constitution.
In my opinion, it's a flawed interpretation despite its origins with a highly respected professor whose legal treatises are fundamental in the field of constitutional law in Uruguay. That's why this interpretation has had such influence. In reality, it's an interpretation based on omission. The professor argued that since the Constitution doesn't distinguish or define who are the nationals of Uruguay, he had to make a distinction. He concluded that natural citizens are nationals, and legal citizens are foreigners.
That's an interpretation. And I believe it even goes against the spirit of the framers of the Constitution.
When the drafters of the original Constitution addressed citizenship, their intention was precisely to be as inclusive as possible. They said, "We don't need to make distinctions like other countries did, where someone might be born or reside in that country and never be granted nationality." Uruguay had a broad commitment to granting nationality to anyone, so they didn't bother making that distinction. Therefore, it's almost paradoxical that we went from an intention by the drafters of the Constitution to be inclusive to a later interpretation of the Constitution that ends up reading it as opposed to inclusion.
If the DNIC in the Ministry of the Interior interprets legal Uruguayan citizenship as a form of naturalization, in other words, a form of nationality, the problem is resolved because that means the passports for legal citizens should state "Uruguayan" under nationality. And if the passport says "Uruguayan," the problem is solved.
There's another option to solve this whole thing that is even simpler. One can argue that the distinction between national and citizen is theoretical and shouldn't be so important in day-to-day administrative practice. We can decide administratively that, for identification purposes, at least, nationality is the same as citizenship.
So, regardless of what the Constitution does or doesn't say, we can decide administratively to label legal citizens as nationals on their passports.
Interviewer: And what resources have been thrown behind this to achieve this result?
Dr. Darío Burstin: Well, since the DNIC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs haven't made this administrative or practical decision, there are two bills that aim to, let's say, push for this. In one case legislators seek to push this to reality through interpreting the Constitution, and, in a second project, the push comes through the path of defining what it means to be a “national” on a passport. The project from the Frente Amplio, presented by Verónica Mato, is the more comprehensive one because, apart from wanting to solve the passport issue, the proposed law also aims to address other problems faced by immigrants, those who apply for citizenship. I know that’s another topic we discussed when we were considering this interview, right? Something immigrants facing legal citizenship already face, the difficulty of diploma validation, their situation when they first arrive, and so on. These are issues that immigrants find much more challenging in their daily lives.
Interviewer: Yes, exactly.
Dr. Darío Burstin: And yet Uruguay is, according to what they say, I don't have direct knowledge, but according to what they say, one of the countries with the most cumbersome procedures and requirements to obtain legal citizenship. The specific problem that the project presented by Verónica Mato tries to tackle is what happens with the citizenship/nationality of immigrant children. Why does this happen? If an immigrant arrives in Uruguay with their family, all born abroad, the immigrant, being of legal age, can apply for legal citizenship. But Uruguay requires legal adulthood to apply for legal citizenship. So, they can apply for it, but their children cannot. In other words, they cannot apply for their children. To become legal Uruguayan citizens, the children will have to wait until they turn 18, and only then can they begin the process. This means, of course, that settled families have children who lack an national identity.
Interviewer: That doesn't mean they don't have an identity.
Dr. Darío Burstin: Well, of course they do as legal residents, but not as citizens. Uruguay is otherwise a country that is quite open and quite inclusive, especially for education.
But the inability to be a citizen, let alone a national, creates identity issues for children, right? Let's say, especially for kids who have grown up here from the age of 3. They feel like they've been part of this country. Here in Uruguay, they feel more Uruguayan than any other “nationality,” and yet, we in Uruguay currently don't recognize them as Uruguayan.
I’ve even heard that some of these children have been denied the chance to carry the national flag at school events because they are not considered nationals. And there are other issues that may seem less important, but they should matter to Uruguayans, such as the possibility of representing us in sports competitions.
A very good friend of mine is a sports journalist, and he mentioned that many immigrant children have great potential to compete and yet this policy denies them the chance or the possibility to represent the nation of Uruguay.
Request for a Thematic Hearing on Statelessness and Nationality in Uruguay
Today I filed a request for a thematic hearing on behalf of Somos Todos Uruguayos. The request, submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, seeks to bring together state, non-state, and civil society actors to review the current Uruguayan implementation of the statelessness conventions and the denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens. If granted, the hearing will occur at the 189th Period of Sessions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) from February 26 to March 7, 2024.
Somos Todos Uruguayos is a Uruguayan civil association representing over 30,000 individuals. It seeks the thematic hearing on Uruguay's adherence to commitments to end statelessness as implemented through domestic law and to address human rights concerns related to the denial of Uruguayan nationality to naturalized citizens, termed "legal citizens" in Uruguay.
An executive summary and extended legal and factual brief were submitted, highlighting the urgent need for a hearing. The request focused on Uruguayan Law No. 19.682, which addressed statelessness but failed to grant nationality to those found stateless. Alternatively, if the law does provide nationality, then Uruguay’s refusal to acknowledge the Uruguayan nationality of all legal citizens is incorrect. The failure of Law No. 19.682, or at least the fact that it is contradictory, raises questions about Uruguay's policies on nationality and citizenship, particularly as Uruguay considers and classifies legal citizens, the highest status attainable by stateless individuals or immigrants, as non-nationals with limited rights compared to nationals.
The proposed thematic discussion aims to resolve these inconsistencies, review the arbitrary revocation and denial of the nationality of Uruguayan legal citizens, present alternative constitutional legal theorists and approaches to the denial of Uruguayan nationality for legal citizens, and potentially avoid the need for a request for precautionary measures or a formal complaint filed first with the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights The discussion was intended to clarify positions and enable civil society, the state, and international actors to progress, either collaboratively or in conflict.
Somos Todos Uruguayos makes clear that it is prepared to proceed with an emergency request and a formal complaint on behalf of the human rights violations to which Uruguayan legal citizens are subjected.
A full copy of the request for a thematic hearing is available for download.
Request for Thematic Hearing
Legal Citizens of Uruguay are Not Foreigners
Uruguay’s most renewed international legal jurist in constitutional law and human rights wrote in 1995 that all citizens of Uruguay are nationals of Uruguay.
Why has this been ignored in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay in favor of less well-reasoned legal opinions, consisting mostly of repetitions of a legal text from the 1940s of dubious intellectual depth on the topic of nationality, repeated by legal scholars in Uruguay to this day?
Here, precisely, is the thesis of Dr. Pérez Pérez, elaborated by him in 1995, and, one might be shocked to learn, considered and somehow rejected by Parliament, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Exterior, and the DNIC in the period beginning in 2015 when Uruguayan legal citizens were denied nationality and stripped of functioning international passports by being labeled as “foreigners.”
As stated at the beginning (supra, para. 2-c), in my opinion, the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical (or fully coincide), at least in a democratic State such as the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners.
Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, born on 15 June 1937 in Montevideo, Uruguay, and passing away on 2 September 2017 in the same city, was perhaps the Uruguayan constitutional lawyer and jurist of the highest international prestige and Uruguay’s most respected figure in the realm of law and human rights. He held the esteemed position of Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 2010 to 2015. His dedication to the field was evident not only in his professional roles but also in his academic pursuits. He was educated at the University of the Republic.
Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez
Pérez Pérez's legal acumen was recognized early in his career. He graduated with honors from the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1960. He next continued his legal training in the United States, achieving highest honors at Southern Methodist University in Texas, and then a Master of Comparative Law from Columbia University.
His teaching career was likewise extraordinary. Pérez Pérez began his career as a professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of the Republic in 1962. Initially teaching Constitutional Law and Public International Law, he soon ascended to the position of a Full Professor of Constitutional Law in 1970. His commitment to human rights was further solidified in 1994 when the Chair of Human Rights was instituted at the Faculty, and he was appointed as its Full Professor.
His leadership qualities were evident when he was elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1973. However, his views were not consistent with the military dictatorship, and his teaching led to his swift dismissal. He was in exile for most of the civil-military dictatorship.
On the international front, Pérez Pérez's contributions were significant. He served the United Nations between 1977 and 1985, culminating his tenure as the Chief of the Administrative Review Department. He was recognized by the Municipality of Montevideo, where he served as the Director General of the Legal Department between 1990 and 1995. In 2006, he played a pivotal role as an Advisor to the Eastern Republic of Uruguay before the International Court of Justice, addressing the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over cellulose plants. In the latter part of his career, from 2010 onwards, Pérez Pérez served as a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the Organization of American States, further cementing his legacy in the field of human rights and law.
Why, precisely, did Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez conclude that all Uruguayan citizens are nationals of Uruguay, both legal citizens and natural citizens?
In his 1995 journal article entitled “Legal citizens are not foreigners,” Dr. Pérez Pérez presented a detailed argument based on Uruguayan constitutional history, Uruguayan constitutional methodology, and domestic and international law.
In an ironic reversal of his positions, almost cruel in its opposition to his true conclusion, lawyers for the Uruguayan government have justified the denial of nationality to Uruguayan naturalized citizens by quoting one small sentence in the article of Dr. Pérez Pérez, out of context. That is, when describing the “orthodox” and incorrect position in Uruguayan constitutional law, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that the foundational Constitutional legal scholar Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga held a view opposite that of Dr. Pérez Pérez. He wrote that Aréchaga, “The introducer of the juridical method in the teaching of Constitutional Law in our country held that … Nationality and citizenship are two entirely distinct individual conditions; and the latter does not proceed from the former, but from membership in a political society.” Further, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that Aréchaga held that “Nationality is a permanent state of individuals which undergoes no alteration whatever the point of the earth they inhabit; citizenship is, on the contrary, variable and alters with the different domiciles which men acquire in the different societies into which mankind is divided.”
Dr. Pérez Pérez did not believe that Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga was correct, either according to Uruguayan history or constitutional methodology. He was stating his position. But when a lawyer for the Uruguayan government wrote one of the key internal legal memorandums labeling Uruguayan legal citizens as foreigners, the only mention of Dr. Pérez Pérez is a citation that Dr. Pérez Pérez himself held the position attributed to Aréchaga. Such a citation is not an example of an outstanding legal citation or scholarship.
Dr. Pérez Pérez presented his legal arguments carefully. The work is so carefully constructed it is almost plodding to a lawyer trained in the United States. Undeniably, it is a renunciation and deconstruction of the legal arguments of those who have defended Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and the denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens.
The article, a presentation in tribute to the fifty-fifth anniversary of the legal journal La Justicia Uruguaya, indicates that Dr. Pérez Pérez addresses “the legal status of legal citizens within the legal system,” meaning the actual treatment such citizens receive. He provides two alternatives, one of which he advocates.
The position he identifies as “orthodox,” or accepted since the 1940s, is that of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. In this position, “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are different and heterogeneous since the former is of a real or sociological nature and the latter of a legal nature.” Notice that I indicate that Dr. Pérez Pérez is not stating fact but rather the assertion of a position he rejects.
A second position, one different from the position espoused by Aréchaga, is that “nationality and citizenship form like two concentric circles, so that all citizens are nationals, although only some nationals are citizens.” For example, this is a position held by the nation in which I practiced law for many years – the United States. Very few nationals of the United States live in the national territory and are subject to broad national sovereignty but do not have the right to participate politically, but there are some. This also describes the position of convicted felons in some states who retain nationality but are stripped of political citizenship.
A third position, diametrically opposed to Aréchaga, is that “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical, at least in a democratic state.” Dr. Pérez Pérez attributes this position to “democratic thought, fundamentally from Rousseau, was consecrated in the revolutions of the 18th century in North America and France and of the 19th century in Spanish-speaking America, and is in my opinion still valid as an interpretation of our constitutional texts, from 1830 to date.”
This view of the philosophical and legal basis of Uruguayan law and the historical evolution of the Constitutions of South America, especially those available in historical context to the constituents of Uruguay in 1829, was fundamental to the research I conducted in my recently published review of Uruguayan nationality and citizenship. It was also, surprisingly, recently rejected out-of-hand, in a rather dismissive manner, by the Chair of Constitutional Law of the University of the Republic during what was intended to be an exchange of ideas at the University of the Republic.
What is this context and history that provides support for the fact that legal citizens were not considered foreigners by the constituents?
Dr. Pérez Pérez begins with the Constitution of Cádiz, the Constitution of 1812, drafted during the Peninsular War, when much of Spain was occupied by Napoleonic France. The Spanish, having retreated to Cádiz, provided the world with one of the original liberal constitutions. The Spanish constitution, of which the constituents were intimately familiar, provided the opportunity for foreigners who obtained a letter of naturalness (“naturaleza”) to become not just citizens of Spain but also Spaniards. Foreigners who obtained this status first became Spaniards and then later obtained a “special letter of citizenship.”
The term nationality, we are informed, was not commonly in use in 1812. It was not common as a concept even in 1829. We are directed to review Vezio Crisafulli and Domenico Nocetti, Vo. "Nazione", Enciclopedia del Diritto, volume XXVII, p. 789. Nevertheless, the concepts mirrored with less grace in the Uruguayan Constitution of 1830 were that all citizens of Spain were Spaniards (“nationals”), but only some Spaniards were citizens. This structure was followed by almost all the other Spanish-American constitutions. The Cádiz model has been followed in the Constitutions of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. I have explored the history of the unadopted Argentinian Constitution our constituents in Uruguay had in hand in 1829 and the Chilean constitution, both of which also adopt the Cádiz model. The fact that there is any confusion about whether the original Uruguayan Constitution also intended to make all citizens “Uruguayans,” therefore what we call nationals, has only to do with inartful drafting and not intention. That inartful drafting was alluded to and forgiveness was sought in the very introduction to the Constitution.
In 1829, Sr. Ellauri, crucial to the drafting of the Constitution and its management, stated, “The commission does not have the vanity to convince itself that it has done an original, great or perfect work.” He continued, “The great and the perfect was compatible with the limited lights of the members of the Commission, and with the difficulties of all kinds that they had to overcome to conclude a work as delicate as it was important.” The Constitution was drafted in various locations, under some need for haste, “mistakes have been suffered in the different accidental residences,” each of which “without the necessary comfort for recollection and meditation, without books and without a numerous society of enlightened citizens to consult.” I sit here today and read these words from my 1870 copy of the Discusion de la Constitucion del Estatado Oriental del Uruguay by Carlos M. de Nava, the copy of which I am privileged to have that was originally used by Jose Maria Vidal. I clearly cherish the Uruguayan Constitution, but I know its origin.
Let us return to the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, who concludes, of course, that:
Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners. This is so both in the case that we call all citizens "nationals," and in the case that (for certain reasons of constitutional text in our country) we reserve this term to distinguish natural citizens and designate legal citizens as "naturalized ". In other words, every national is a citizen, and every citizen is a national (or "naturalized"), even if not all of them can exercise political or active citizenship rights.
Why is this accurate and the best interpretation of the Uruguayan constitution?
This is in agreement with the liberal and democratic conceptions that inspired the Uruguayan constitution since the constituents of 1829.
There is no evidence that the original or later constituents distinguished between nationality and citizenship.
A proper use of the Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology, ironically developed extensively by Justino Jimenez de Arechaga, supports that legal citizens are not foreigners, or, in the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, “as regards the constitutional texts, in an interpretation that takes into account the provisions in force as a whole and extracts from them all the interpretative consequences in accordance with the general principles” does not support the denial of nationality to legal citizens.
Finally, more importantly than ever, given the growth of control of conventionality in the Inter-American system, denying nationality to legal citizens is contrary to public international law at both the customary and conventional levels.
Dr. Pérez Pérez expands upon and supports each of those four points, but the logic and evidence in his favor are overwhelming. It was after reviewing this article that I designed my further research, testing these propositions of Dr. Pérez Pérez, resulting in the publication of La Interpretación Constitucional De La Nacionalidad Uruguaya De Acuerdo Con La Metodologia Constitucional Uruguaya, available at the link below.
I encourage anyone interested to review the article by Dr. Pérez Pérez or to comment and engage with my article. I provide both links here.
Announcing the publication of “The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology,” 29 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 443 (2023).
I am pleased to announce the publication of my article on the constitutional interpretation of Uruguayan nationality. The article was published in English and Spanish and is available in Westlaw. A summary of the work is provided below.
The National Directorate of Civil Identification (DNIC) of Uruguay today issues Uruguayan passports to legal Uruguayan citizens (naturalized citizens) but refuses to recognize them as nationals of Uruguay . In other words, legal Uruguayan citizens carry a passport that indicates that they are not nationals of Uruguay. The Uruguayan state claims that this results from an interpretation of the Uruguayan Constitution made in 2018. The interpretation is based only on secondary sources based on an opinion of an Uruguyan legal scholar, Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, articulated clearly by 1946. Uruguay is the only country in the world to declare that it has no path to naturalization for any immigrant. Uruguay instead allows "legal citizens" to obtain permanent status in Uruguay and obtain Uruguayan passports. The denial of nationality to legal citizens causes tremendous problems when these Uruguayans travel, places in question whether they receive diplomatic protection, and creates two classes of Uruguayans.
This manuscript analyzes the opinion of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and other Uruguayan constitutional legal scholars by applying the constitutional interpretative method developed by Uruguayan legal scholars. This method, labelled within Uruguay as the logical-systematic-teleological method of constitutional interpretation, contains precise instructions on the steps and approaches to be taken in interpretating the Constitution.
The source of the confusion and the resulting unique position that Uruguay maintains in denying any process for naturalization for its immigrants results from a misinterpretation of Article 81 of the current Constitution. The predecessor this clause, Article 71, was added only in the 1934 Constitution, and the surprising conclusion that Uruguay's constitution disallows all naturalization is not based on the interpretation most compatible with the Uruguay Constitution nor does it follow the Uruguayan method of constitutional interpretation.
Uruguay often interprets its Constitution through positive law. The current law governing nationality, Law 16.021, is based solely on the misinterpretation of Article 81. Efforts to reform Uruguayan law have begun and Uruguay could easily provide an interpretation of its Constitution on these issues that comports with its own internal interpretative methodology, expands rights in accord with its tradition, and that is in accord with Uruguay's international convention obligations.
La República Oriental del Uruguay es una asociación política de los habitantes en el territorio y sus participantes políticos, sus ciudadanos, son lo que la comunidad internacional considera uruguayos
La República Oriental del Uruguay, tal como se define en el artículo 1 de la Constitución, es la asociación política de los habitantes dentro de su territorio. Esta definición, que data de la constitución original de Uruguay en 1830, la diferencia de otras definiciones de estados o naciones en ese momento e incluso sigue siendo inusual en la actualidad. Para comprender el contexto en el que se redactó la constitución uruguaya en 1829, es esencial considerar varias influencias en sus redactores.
Al menos tres ejemplos previos de constituciones probablemente tuvieron importancia para quienes redactaron la constitución uruguaya. El primero es la Constitución Española de Cádiz de 1812, que estaría en vigor cuando las colonias españolas declararon su independencia. Según esta constitución, la nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios y la soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación, otorgándole el derecho exclusivo de establecer leyes fundamentales. El segundo ejemplo es la Constitución de 1819 de las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica, que no proporcionó una definición clara de "las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica". Por último, la Constitución de Argentina de 1826, aunque nunca se ratificó, comparte similitudes con la constitución uruguaya y probablemente fue consultada. Esta establece que la nación argentina es para siempre libre e independiente, no siendo propiedad de ningún individuo o familia, y adopta una forma de gobierno republicana representativa.
Las constituciones chilenas de 1822, 1828 y 1833 también ofrecen perspectivas sobre la definición de una nación. La Constitución de Chile de 1822 define la nación chilena como la unión de todos los chilenos, con la soberanía que reside esencialmente en la nación. La Constitución de 1828 amplía aún más, indicando que la nación chilena es una asociación política de todos los chilenos naturales y legales, libres e independientes de poderes extranjeros, y dividida en ocho provincias. La Constitución de 1833 no define explícitamente a Chile, pero reitera la naturaleza popular y representativa de su gobierno, la indivisibilidad de la República de Chile y la soberanía esencial de la nación delegada a las autoridades establecidas por la constitución.
Al comparar estos ejemplos, se hace evidente que la definición de la República Oriental del Uruguay se destaca. Mientras que la Constitución Española de 1812 define España como una reunión de españoles, incluyendo a individuos naturalizados, y las constituciones chilenas de 1822 y 1828 definen sus respectivas naciones como la unión de todos los chilenos, Uruguay define de manera única su República como una asociación política de habitantes. Esta distinción sigue siendo única, ya que otras naciones suelen referirse a su "nación" o "estado" en lugar de una asociación política.
La influencia de estos modelos constitucionales en los redactores de la constitución de Uruguay es evidente, pero la definición única de Uruguay refleja el contexto histórico y político específico en el que se estableció. Al definir la nación como una asociación política, Uruguay enfatiza la inclus ón y la naturaleza colectiva de su república, destacando la importancia de sus habitantes en la configuración de la gobernabilidad y legislación del país. Esta definición distintiva de la República Oriental del Uruguay sigue dando forma a su identidad como estado-nación, diferenciándolo de otros marcos constitucionales y resaltando la importancia de su pueblo en el entramado político del país.
La Constitución uruguaya de 1830 no denota explícitamente a los individuos como "nacionales" o "uruguayos", sino que habla en términos de ciudadanos - tanto naturales como legales. Concibe a la nación como una entidad política compuesta por sus ciudadanos, independientemente de su nacionalidad. La ciudadanía podía adquirirse a través del nacimiento en el país o cumpliendo con los criterios de ciudadanía legal.
Es posible que la Constitución haya considerado la "nacionalidad" como un concepto subordinado, menos significativo en comparación con la ciudadanía. La República Oriental del Uruguay no se constituyó sobre la base de la nacionalidad, sino como una asamblea política. Curiosamente, los individuos podían nacer y vivir en Uruguay sin ser ciudadanos, lo que generó un debate sobre el estatus de estos residentes no ciudadanos, especialmente las mujeres.
Justino Jiménez de Arechaga Moratorio señaló estas ambigüedades, pero a pesar de ello, la definición única de Uruguay de la nación enfatiza su naturaleza política. Los ciudadanos participan en la política, ejercen sus derechos y son miembros integrales de la república, con el derecho de permanecer, servir, cumplir deberes y poseer pasaportes internacionales. Todos bajo la protección de la República merecen estos derechos, no solo aquellos nacidos en suelo uruguayo o sus descendientes.
El entendimiento internacional de "nacional" se alinea más con la avanzada definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay que con el lugar de nacimiento. Si Uruguay ve la "nacionalidad" - el término globalmente utilizado para referirse a los ciudadanos - como problemática, podría demostrar su perspectiva progresista traduciéndola a su concepto de ciudadanía.
El enfoque de Uruguay puede indicar su avance sobre otras naciones en la ampliación del concepto de pertenencia al estado. En el derecho internacional, la idea de un estado no está necesariamente vinculada a la nación. Así, el estado uruguayo podría estar compuesto por personas de múltiples nacionalidades. Todos los ciudadanos pertenecen políticamente a Uruguay y se consideran "uruguayos" globalmente, a pesar de las diferentes nacionalidades.
Las discrepancias lingüísticas no deberían oscurecer los derechos sustantivos. Un individuo "sin estado" en inglés, "staatenlos" en alemán, o "no es miembro de un país" en chino apuntan hacia conceptos similares. Parece que la definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay se alinea más estrechamente con el concepto global de "nacionalidad" que cualquier otro término en Uruguay. Por lo tanto, la postura progresista de Uruguay en esta área no debería verse minada debido a un malentendido léxico.
Uruguay ha comprendido durante mucho tiempo un amplio entendimiento de "nacionalidad", aunque bajo la etiqueta de "ciudadanía", para evitar cualquier implicación étnica, nacionalista o nativista. Su posición histórica en cuanto a la ciudadanía inclusiva y la pertenencia al estado merece ser enaltecida. Su reconocimiento de que la ciudadanía no depende únicamente del lugar de nacimiento y su esfuerzo por remediar la apatridia ofreciendo ciudadanía legal, subrayan su compromiso de proteger los derechos individuales y garantizar una amplia participación nacional.
No se debe permitir que un malentendido en el vocabulario disminuya el liderazgo de Uruguay en este campo. Uruguay debe explicar que tuvo una amplia "nacionalidad" antes que casi cualquier otra nación en el mundo y que el concepto simplemente se etiquetó como "ciudadanía" para evitar connotaciones étnicas, nacionalistas o nativistas.
Nationality and Citizenship in Uruguayan Constitutional Doctrine
It is essential for the English-speaking world and the broader international legal community to understand the current legal framework separating nationality and citizenship in Uruguay. I start with one of the leading and honored experts in Uruguayan Constitution Law and International Law, Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas. Dr. Correa Freitas published the sixth edition of Derecho Constitucional Conemporaneo in 2019.
Dr. Correa Freitas indicates that nationality and citizenship hold significant legal-political implications, involving domestic Public Law, specifically Constitutional Law, and International Law. The complex historical context and evolving global landscape, including migratory flows and political events, have impacted the study and regulation of these concepts. Consequently, analyzing nationality and citizenship through Comparative Law, he writes, is crucial for identifying common criteria recognized by the international community to address the legal-political aspects of this phenomenon.
Moreover, if one can assert that Constitutional Law is the science of freedom, I believe that nationality and citizenship hold a position as significant as that, for it would be futile for an individual to be free if they lack a nation or are unable to actively participate in the political life of their state as a citizen.
To those trained in international law in jurisdictions other than Uruguay, the following will initially appear foreign and somewhat confusing. The experience may be one of finding oneself in an unfamiliar city with a map that has a legend, but the words on the legend, while used in other cities of the world, have a different meaning for the authors of this particular map. The map's author and the person using it think the words in the legend have a clear meaning. But the world and Uruguay, the person using the map and the author of the map in my metaphor, do not mean the same thing by the exact words.
It is easy to get lost when that is the case. But what follows is a clear and precise explanation of the Uruguayan legal doctrine.
Dr. Correa Freitas argues that it is crucial to distinguish between nationality and citizenship, as they are different concepts that sometimes need clarification. Nationality is an original link between a person and a State or Nation, established by birth or blood connection with parents. On the other hand, citizenship is a political relationship between an individual and a State, conferring certain rights and duties. International law emphasizes the right to nationality and the right to change nationality while asserting that no person can have more than one nationality. Nationality is opposed to foreignness, and citizenship is divided into natural and legal citizenship. Consequently, it is essential to differentiate between nationality and foreignness, as well as natural and legal citizenship.
In Comparative Law, Dr. Corre Freitas indicates, the distinction between nationality and citizenship is well-established. Various constitutions, such as those of Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Peru, distinguish between nationals and foreigners and regulate citizenship separately. They address the rights and duties of citizens, focusing on aspects such as age and political qualifications. This distinction highlights the importance of understanding the differences between nationality and citizenship in a legal context.
It is worth noting, and perhaps marking for later discussion, that the examples provided in this text do not support an assertion that any of the listed nations deny nationality to naturalized citizens. The examples do provide information on how each nation addresses the differences between being a national and having the right to participate in the political life of the State.
Continuing to review the outstanding explanation of this view of the Uruguayan Constitution, Dr. Correa Freitas informs that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, nationality and citizenship are regulated in Section III, with natural citizens being those born in the country or children of Oriental parents who settle and register in the Civic Registry. Nationality is not lost even by naturalizing in another country and can be regained by settling in the Republic and registering in the Civic Registry. The Constitution adopts "ius soli" and "ius sanguinis" criteria for nationality, with Oriental nationality being irrevocable and allowing for dual nationality. However, confusion exists between nationality and natural citizenship, as demonstrated by the illogical provision of suspension of citizenship for not reaching eighteen years of age.
The conclusion on the doctrine of Uruguayan nationality and its comparison to citizenship can then be summarized.
In summary: applying the logical-systematic interpretation criterion, it can be concluded that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, a distinction is made between nationals and foreigners on one hand, and natural citizens and legal citizens on the other hand. According to the constitutional text, nationality and natural citizenship are synonymous, meaning that every man or woman born in Uruguay, strictly speaking in the territory of the Republic, or a child of an Oriental father or mother who settles and registers in the Civic Registry, is a natural citizen (Article 74) and therefore, national, irrevocably according to Article 81.
In 1989, Law No. 16,021 was enacted to regulate nationality in Uruguay due to confusion in the existing Uruguayan Constitution. The law recognizes the criteria of "jus soli" (place of birth) and "jus sanguinis" (blood ties with father or mother), granting Uruguayan nationality to those born in the Republic's territory and their children, regardless of birthplace.
Initially, Law No. 16,021 didn't grant natural citizenship to children of persons born abroad who were granted Uruguayan nationality. Law No. 19,362, enacted on December 31, 2015, corrected this by granting natural citizenship to such children.
Law No. 16,021 also interprets Article 74 of the Constitution, defining "avecinamiento" (settlement) and its requirements for obtaining Uruguayan nationality. Amended by Law No. 18,858 on December 23, 2011, "avecinamiento" occurs when actions unequivocally demonstrate a person's intention, such as living in the country for over three months, renting or acquiring property, establishing a business, obtaining employment, or enrolling in an educational institution for a minimum of two months. Two of these requirements must be presented before the Electoral Court, which verifies the information and proceeds with registration (Article 5, as amended by Law No. 19,362 of 12/31/15).
The summary of Uruguayan law on this matter is stated succinctly.
After analyzing the Uruguayan constitutional system and considering comparative law, the following conclusions can be drawn:
a) The Uruguayan Constitution confuses the concepts of nationality and citizenship, particularly between nationality and natural citizenship.
b) There is a significant trend, especially in Latin American constitutionalism, to separately and rigorously regulate nationality and citizenship.
c) Generally, the criteria of "jus soli" and "jus sanguinis" are accepted as means of acquiring nationality, without prejudice to admitting naturalization.
d) It is advisable to promote the signing of international treaties that regulate the acquisition and loss of nationality and conflicts of dual nationality.
e) In a future constitutional reform in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, provisions related to nationality and citizenship should be modified to adapt them to modern trends in doctrine and comparative constitutional law.
Dr. Correa Freitas leaves the possibility that the Uruguayan Constitution could be subject to a reform to adapt to modern trends and states that there is no prejudice in admitting naturalization as a source of nationality in such a reform.
Uruguay is “the true California” - La Republica Oriéntale del Uruguay - Pubblicazione Ufficiale
In 1870, the Consul General of Uruguay published an immigration guide for Italian immigrants. It was written in Italian. The purpose of the publication was to provide “positive, truthful and practical piece of advice that will genuinely and without deception or subterfuge clarify to the emigrant what lies ahead.” Why? Because “emigrants often do not know what to decide, whether to believe those who promise them paradise or those who predict hell.”
In addition to extolling the virtues of emigrating from Italy to Uruguay, the Consul hoped that immigrants would provide labor and industry to develop the Uruguayan economy and infrastructure. He wrote, “the Republic of Uruguay, amidst peace and prosperity, is making giant strides towards progress, and all it needs are hands, hands, and more hands.”
The publication does not speak of nationality. It does not address citizenship or the process of obtaining it. But it does indicate that its “citizens,” without dividing the natural citizens from the legal citizens, are all called “Orientals.”
Geopolitically, commercially, and politically, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay takes its name from the ancient designation "Banda Oriental," which served during the times of Spanish domination to indicate the province located to the east of the Uruguay River. For the same reason, the citizens of Uruguay are called "Orientals."
The ease of migration is stressed. The Consul explained the services available on arrival. The publication includes a table indicating that the wages in Uruguay exceeded those in Europe. When all of this is considered, the Consul indicates emigrating is advantageous.
It can be said without exaggeration that the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, without exploiting its gold, is a true California, with the difference that in the Gold Rush era, California was a social chaos, while in the Oriental Republic, there exists a well-ordered, moral, and hardworking society, of which more than sixty thousand Italians form a part and have improved their condition through work, which is the source of all wealth.
It is difficult to sufficiently emphasize Uruguay's “open door” policy at this time. A Central Office of Immigration was established in 1865, only 35 years after the founding of the Republic. The Consul, in this pamphlet seeking to encourage immigration, described the functions of the office.
There is a central immigration office in Montevideo, which has the sole purpose of protecting immigrants who arrive in the territory of the Republic, providing them with the necessary means and providing them with the information and advice they may need to obtain a position that can truly improve their fate and fortune.
This institution dates back to December 2, 1865, when a presidential decree appointed an Immigration Commission (which includes two Italians, Messrs. Sivori and Folie) and a statistical office concerning it.
The Central Office of Immigration, located at 79 Colon Street in Montevideo, provides invaluable services to immigrants free of charge. Even though they arrive in the country completely new and unknown, they find in this office a sincere friend, a reliable guide, and a wise and diligent protector.
Today, in 2023, Uruguay is in another period of immigration, though nowhere near the scale of its historical periods of immigration. Perhaps its earlier history of welcoming new citizens is worth considering in deciding whether Uruguay today also needs “hand, hands, hands” to prosper. Clearly, the current population, most of whom arrived during this period of immediate and free social services encouraging immigration, benefited from Uruguay’s earlier policies and expenditure of tax funds.
In 1870 what services didi Uruguay provide, from the public treasury, to ensure justice and integration of its immigrants?
The main functions of the Central Office of Immigration are as follows:
It arranges for the landing of immigrants arriving at the port, sending a person from the office aboard ships arriving with immigrants and transporting all those who wish to stay in the Oriental State to the shore, providing them with free lodging and maintenance until they have found work or occupation.
It gathers all the necessary and most appropriate data in order to provide immigrants with all the useful information about the country, as well as to know where workers are particularly needed. To this end, it also keeps a special register where all the requests for workers and laborers made by its agents in the countryside and other parts of the Republic, as well as by private individuals both inside and outside the city, are recorded.
In this way, it facilitates and indeed tirelessly works to find a suitable position, according to their aptitude, for every immigrant who has turned to it. It arranges for the transport of the applicants who live in the countryside to the place where they are wanted, and when necessary, it covers all the costs of their transportation to any part of the Republic.
It intervenes in the contracts entered into between private individuals and immigrants who have placed themselves under its protection in order to protect their rights and interests. It issues the relevant certificates accrediting the quality of the immigrant. It arranges for immigrants settled in the country to write to their relatives and families overseas with punctuality and facilitates the means of doing so with the least possible expense.
Finally, it intervenes in everything that can be useful and advantageous to immigrants, protecting them in all the difficult circumstances they may encounter, whether due to lack of means of subsistence or work, or due to rights or interests that may be defrauded, or even due to violations of police edicts or other minor violations of the laws of the country that may not be well known or well understood by them.
The so-called Foreign Colonies - Reasons for Their Existence and Ways to Nationalize Immigrants
Carlos María Ramírez Álvarez y Obes (1848-1898) was a Uruguayan journalist, essayist, novelist, and politician born in Rio Grande del Sur, Brazil. He graduated in Jurisprudence in 1868 and started his journalism career in the newspaper El Siglo, where he expressed his opposition to General Lorenzo Batlle's government. Due to his strong stance, he was deported to Buenos Aires with his brother Gonzalo.
Ramírez joined the Colorado Party during the Revolution of the Lances but soon became disillusioned and focused on creating a new political movement, the Constitutional Party. He taught constitutional law at the University of the Republic and later held various public positions, including Fiscal of Government and Finance and Uruguay's Legation in the Empire of Brazil.
During Lorenzo Latorre's period, Ramírez dedicated himself to researching national history. He compiled his political ideas in a pamphlet titled "La guerra civil y los partidos políticos del Uruguay" (1882), which outlined the basic principles of the projected Constitutional Party. He was involved in the creation of the newspaper El Plata, which served as the voice of his ideology.
Ramírez participated in the first Pedagogical Congress in South America held in Buenos Aires in 1882. In addition to his political activities, he wrote novels, essays, and several posthumously published works. He was appointed Minister of Finance in Juan Lindolfo Cuestas' government in 1891 and later served as a Senator from 1893 to 1898.
Here I translate a two-part article Ramírez published in 1871, in La Bandera Radical.
La Bandera Radical, 18 June 1871: Year 1, Number 21.
FIRST ARTICLE
During the three years in which the daily press offered us a place, we remember with pleasure having devoted our intelligence and time to the unpleasant elucidation of legal issues regarding diplomatic immunities, the extension of the right of asylum, justice, and opportunity for foreign claims, and many others among the most serious that the jurisprudence of modern nations entails.
What motivated us to deal with these tedious matters was undoubtedly not the inclinations of a legalistic spirit, by which, far from feeling dominated, we have always felt an instinctive repulsion. It is not the confusing laws written by men or nations in their variable codes and statutes but rather the simple law engraved by the Orderer of the world in the natural essence of human relations, the great object of study that has always presented itself with enchantment to our eyes. And undoubtedly, that is why we experienced true intellectual pleasure when we descended to explore the labyrinth of contradictions that the internal law presents.
These high sentiments are impenetrable in their depth and reproducing them in words is like trying to capture a fleeting breeze. It is possible to capture the sentiments only with a general approach to the resolutions adopted. The principle, the sentiment of sovereignty and national independence, led us to discover supreme importance in fixing the just limit in which the country's jurisdiction should only yield its rights to the respect and rights of a foreign power. The eminent Vico speaks to us of civic modesty; an Oriental publicist has developed this expression, telling us of republican modesty; before civic or republican modesty, there is patriotic modesty.
New and weak peoples of America and the South have found themselves in a peculiar situation concerning the powerful nations that exist in the Old World; needing population and capital to complement the efficient development of their laws and achieve complete control of their destinies, they have had to maintain generous and cordial relations with the European states that could provide them with those indispensable instruments of organization and progress but in determining this consecutive and immediate contact and producing such a vast increase in the natural solidarity of nations, a highly dangerous situation has been created.
The Spanish American peoples have appeared as servile tributaries of other peoples; they have gathered in their midst all kinds of heterogeneous and diverse elements; they have presented a body without unity or strength of their own to the abusive pretensions of the great powers with whom they have inevitably placed themselves in a very close alliance of interests and destinies.
From here has resulted that very special jurisprudence that Europe has tried to impose on America, equating it in its international relations with the semi-savage peoples of the East; that very special jurisprudence which has cost so many contributions to the honor and wealth of all South American peoples, and particularly the two Republics of the Plata.
It is true, as General Mitre observes in a recent article, that the abusive demands have always encountered discussion and protest, so that the principles have been saved within the scope of reason and law; America can claim as a triumph of its own doctrines, in a high degree, the declaration that has compensated, to a certain extent, for the damages suffered by its British subjects in the course of the Franco-German war.
However, the great national question is not yet resolved with the honest and loyal recognition of the principles that should serve as a basis for it, by someone who is generally acknowledged to possess remarkable competence as a statesman.
Inside our house, there is an Italian colony, a Spanish colony, a French colony, a German colony, a Brazilian colony, a British colony, and many others... Where does the Oriental sovereignty stand?
These are not agricultural, industrial, or commercial colonies spontaneously formed by accidental interaction and governed by the common principles of civil societies; no! They are genuine projections of the motherland, strongly organized with the bond of their nationality of origin, aspiring to form a distinct entity under the protection and direction of their respective diplomatic Minister, or even their respective consular agent!
They don't think with our ideas, nor speak our language, nor live with our customs, nor familiarize themselves with our institutions, nor blend with our nationality.
Concentrated within their own circles, each of the so-called foreign colonies imprints its own special character on everything that belongs to them and everything related to them. If they engage in trade, we have English trade, German trade, Italian trade, etc. If they acquire real estate, we come across the flag announcing a Spanish property, a French property, etc. If they raise offspring, a false baptismal certificate comes, which, in defiance of all our laws, maintains the perpetuity of the nationality of origin and isolates the indigenous population amidst an immense sea of foreign aggregations!
How can we explain this recent phenomenon, which, upon observation, cannot help but raise doubts and patriotic hesitations in our souls? Is it the work of our institutions, the work of our laws? No, because our institutions are far superior to those of the peoples who favor us with their immigration - no, because our laws open up the broadest field for the unification of all the elements that may be welcomed in the country.
The codes establish perfect equality of civil rights between natives and foreigners; taxes do not weigh more heavily on the latter than on the former; even our rivers are open to all the flags of the world.
As for exercising public rights, it is enough to say that we offer citizenship with as much generosity as the most generous nation on earth. In vain, General Pacheco said that if old Rome existed in all its splendor, he would not exchange the title of Oriental citizen for that of a Roman citizen. We must acknowledge with sorrow that this is not generally thought of in this way; a false document would today be much more valuable to many people than the genuine title of an Oriental citizen.
The laws of the United States, whose liberality towards foreigners is often praised, are far from offering as many privileges as our laws; it is enough to point out two aspects of North American legislation to understand its spirit - one cannot be a landowner or a bank director without being a citizen of the Union.
If we were to establish these principles, we would not achieve foreigners becoming naturalized to be property owners or bankers, but we would make them emigrate to other countries instead of having them as guests. Common sense has always told us that we must open wide all doors through which the immigrants of the world may feel enticed to enter our home.
With this idea in mind, we have not done everything that can be done, but we have done enough to demonstrate that our laws are not the real cause of the profound national anarchy in which we live.
Could it be our habits, our customs, our sociability? Anyone who knows the country knows that foreigners are everywhere and are received by everyone with spontaneous demonstrations of cordiality and sympathy.
Their race and religion do not concern anyone in the slightest.
In the family and industry, society and commerce, they are received as friends and brothers.
At every step, their opinion is invoked, and their cooperation is sought.
Governments seek their support, and revolutionaries place their hopes in them.
From there, the foreign population is sought after by the law and sought after by men who identify entirely with our own national life, and yet they remain indifferent, detached, entrenched in the traditionalism of their existing traditions, contradicting in a way the age-old wisdom of the adage that tells us: where there is property, there is the homeland.
How can we explain this phenomenon?
For our part (and in a forthcoming article, we hope to demonstrate this clearly), we believe this is the inevitable result of our old factions and the ongoing civil war in which they are embroiled.
La Bandera Radical, 2 July 1871: Year 1, Number 23
SECOND ARTICLE
Jules Duval, the illustrious historian of human migration in the 19th century, wrote that towards the end of 1856, when the population was flocking more strongly to North America, a party formed in some parts of the Union that, exaggerating the famous principle of Monroe, aimed to put limitations on the introduction of foreign elements. This party worked and agitated everywhere; propaganda, public meetings, the organization of conventions, and even some popular excesses were the visible signs with which it appeared on the scene, without achieving anything other than to maintain itself on it for the brief space of two years.
By 1856, the Know-Nothing party had completely disappeared because public sentiment rejected the idea of finding a national danger in the great phenomenon that had contributed so much to the development of the United States.
If a similar party were to appear in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, its existence would also be equally precarious and temporary; but for very different reasons than those that produced the same outcome in the Republic of the North. Whether our patriotic susceptibilities want it or not, without foreign capital or a foreign population, our nationality would never attain the necessary elements to call itself such and rise on the ladder of progress, following the harmonic movement of humanity. The immigration that comes to our shores could be a great national danger. Yet, we would be morally forced to receive it because the opposite intention, the isolation of Paraguay during the reign of Francia and Lopez, the consummation of all possible dangers, would imply suicide.
The American Union finds itself, and found itself since the mid-19th century, in a very different situation, because it already contained everything necessary to constitute a great association of its own life and growing influence on the destiny of all humanity. Suppose the Union opens its doors to the emigrant classes of Europe. In that case, it is not so much to increase the population of the lands it already occupies, but to satisfy its colossal aspirations for expansion, invading like a continuous tide, with the wave of the most beautiful civilization in the world, the fertile deserts that extend around its States.
In general, North Americans are accused of being conquerors, but the true conquest they carry out, without needing any other, is the conquest of virgin nature and the exhausted elements that Europe sends to revitalize its essence in the powerful source of democratic institutions. Within the Union, the foreigner immediately identifies his life with the life of the people he joins because, from the very first moment, he sees the development of the interests he brings or the realization of the future he hopes for linked to the unfolding of that life. The vague memory of the homeland consecrated by the tradition of sentiment is overshadowed by the active consciousness of a new homeland that attracts him with the generous offering of man's most necessary and esteemed goods. The head of the family may die in the old religion, but the new religion remains in his home, and the descendants of the fortunate emigrant know and love only the same homeland in which they were born.
Such is the force of national assimilation that the United States, offering liberalities to immigration, have come to declare that the children of foreigners can choose at their discretion between their nationality of origin and their nationality of birth - (See Jules Duval - Emigration in the 19th century: page 189.) How not to see that the United States have done so, like the mother who offers ample freedom to her tender children, sure that filial love will keep them constantly in her care!
With similar institutions and with an equally hospitable character, as we demonstrated in our first article, the Oriental Republic, as it advances in its independent career and progresses as a receptacle for foreign immigration, manages only to form a juxtaposition of colonies, under whose regime and preponderance, nationality loses its strength, dignity, and prestige. It is governed by the same psychological laws as the opposite phenomenon observed in the great Republic of the North. The foreigner comes to our shores; he is attracted by the fame of our fields' fertility, the high remuneration of work, or the ease with which he can advance in the various careers of commerce. We now have him transplanted to our soil. Let's watch him grow like an exotic plant.
People have an irresistible tendency to inform themselves about the issues being debated in the land where they live, an irresistible tendency to establish immediate and permanent communication with the society in which their person is and where their interests are rooted. It is the effect of the instinct for sociability, on the one hand, and intelligent and foresighted selfishness, on the other - selfishness and sociability, two inseparable feelings of the human heart. Obeying these feelings, the foreigner directs an inquisitive gaze at the political stage of the country and finds a fierce struggle between two factions that do not represent any practical program of principles, reforms, improvements, or any of the aspirations that can favor or flatter the legitimate conveniences of a man completely alien to the traditions of a people. He finds the fierce struggle of two factions that tear each other apart to death for slogans and passions of a dark past where virtue and crime, glory and ferocity, are all involved in an indecipherable enigma of civil convulsions, as terrible as the most terrible ones that the annals of humanity have known. Finally, he finds the sterile and bloody debate of historical divisions that have always led nations astray when seeking the peaceful and fruitful movement of the forces that operate in the growth of societies and the happiness of their members! Then comes the reaction of sociability and selfishness. The foreigner turns his gaze away from that dark picture and looks for the center among his fellow nationals where he can expand his feelings and achieve the irresistible community of legitimate interests. We would be very mistaken if this is not the deep internal cause that outlines, at the heart of our sociability, the unique creation of foreign colonies.
Here, as always, the exception only serves to confirm the rule. There was a moment when all the inhabitants of the country, or at least the capital where its vital forces are concentrated, came together in a single national sentiment, fighting for the exact cause in a heroic defense. It was because, at that time, the struggle had been defined in clear and specific terms, revealing to all foreigners the interests at stake in the conflict and also the combatants where general interests found representation and protection. Subsequently, disastrous events occurred; the factions were fatally reconstituted with their old leaders at the helm; a continuous succession of equal mistakes and crimes became the prominent feature of the struggle. And then, the identification of a great moment began to break apart; sympathies that were once concentrated in one point became divided and wavered uncertainly from one extreme to the other until they turned away from both, definitively establishing the deep national divorce that is characterizing itself with the new aggregations of forces that, in a different situation, should strengthen and bring splendor to the Nation.
The phenomenon described would lose much of its influence if the struggle of the historical parties did not inevitably take on the form of a chronic war. In times of peace, even if only for economic interests and the realization of the physiocratic motto - laissez-faire, laissez-passer - the munificence of nature and work would reconcile the foreigner with the intrinsic conditions of the country, and their descendants would come to form a center where political transformations would find the most vigorous resources for their action. The constant civil war has very diverse effects, in which the parties set the Republic ablaze.
The first to suffer the effects of this scourge are labor, capital, and the general wealth of the country. Just when the foreigner begins to savor the fruit of their toil and gather the harvest of their efforts, political convulsions hinder the progress of mercantile business and relax all the springs of industrial activity. The convulsion passes quickly, and when hopes were about to be reborn with the prosperity of labor, the political convulsion comes to cover the horizon with the glow of destruction and bloodshed.
Thus, years go by under the fatal regime of anarchy, with no more respite than brief moments of armistice. That land, which God and institutions made generously hospitable, is turned by our parties into a treacherous trap of turmoil and ruin. Instead of forming a beautiful Eden, people seem determined to create an inferno.
In this way, immigration will retreat from our ports; emigration will begin in our own home; and if, for providential reasons concerning the future of the Republic, emigration does not occur on a large scale and immigration continues to flow excessively, we will see colonies take shape, not just as a social phenomenon, but as a political organization. Civil war brings plunder, dispossession, and humiliations that the foreign population cannot bear with impunity since none of their positive interests are involved in the causes and outcomes of that war. They suffer losses without compensation; they are ruined without recognizing a just cause that justifies sacrificing everything that linked them to our land. How can you expect them not to complain? How can you expect them not to defend their most legitimate rights? How can you expect them not to turn to the authorities of their country if yours cannot compensate or even put an end to their grievances?
There is even more to the issue. It is well known that civil war stimulates and develops the violent tendencies of people; periods of political upheaval are always times of excess and private crimes. As if the state that a famous philosopher assumes to be natural for humans were the case, or at least the state before the human condition, it is true that bloodshed has an intoxicating and contagious influence within political societies. Murders are the inevitable entourage of war. The most valuable asset, life, which can never be replaced, is left at the mercy of the most terrible threats. Meanwhile, the force of social repression disappears. In the dire necessities of the struggle, a criminal becomes a soldier, if not a leader, and it would be foolish to deprive oneself of him. In supreme moments, which are constantly repeated, a battalion is formed from the public jail that soon becomes a veteran and a patriot. All the mechanisms of the judicial administration are relaxed, and the sense of justice loses its energy in all the magistracies of the country. There are no guarantees for human life, nor punishment for murderers. Do you think foreigners will let themselves be killed with impunity? Do you think they will not seek someone to guarantee their lives? Do you think they will not try by all possible means to find punishment for the criminals who have preyed on their countrymen? At every step, we have to see that foreign ministers, harassed by their subjects and representing the dearest interests of their citizens, demand that those accused of crimes committed on our territory be tried outside of our territory, as Mr. Munro did not long ago in notes as truthful as they are depressing about our social state.
Here is why in our country there are these colonies of immigrants with an exclusive spirit, with their own interests, with an independent existence, constantly demanding the intervention of an authority that represents and satisfies their peculiar collective needs.
Rejected from identification with our historical parties, each national group concentrates within its own circle; without protection for its members' property and life in the constant turmoil of war, it naturally aspires to form a government that ensures the enjoyment of these fundamental rights.
By themselves, nothing is lacking for these national groups to constitute colonies; it is necessary to recognize that they have had reason to be called that way.
Can this situation last?
Are there ways to repair such great evils?
We will express our opinion in another article.
A copy of the original in Spanish is available here.
A Life Dedicated to International Law
In memory of a life dedicated to international law on the fifth anniversary of his early passing. David D. Caron had a profound impact on my education and the life I have chosen to live.
As we recently marked the fifth anniversary of his passing on February 20th, I have been reflecting on the life and work of my mentor, David D. Caron, in the field of public international law.
His influence on my life, education, and professional growth was profound.
Professor Caron, or David, as he asked to be called early in our work, served as the dean of the King's College London School of Law and was an emeritus professor of the UC Berkeley School of Law. He was a renowned expert in international law, focusing on international dispute resolution, international courts and tribunals, and international environmental law. He was a member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and a Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice.
He guided me through Berkeley Law on a path of demanding classes about International Law, International Human Rights, and International Environmental Law. He then counseled me to take courses on International Business Transactions, Private International Dispute Resolution, Constitutional Law, and International Trade Law. Passing through the gauntlet of these courses, Professor Caron listened and advised me on research in international law. I investigated the Tinoco Arbitration, a ruling that ordered the Costa Rican government established by a 1917 coup d’etat to pay certain UK loans and the role of the "recognition" of governments.
Professor Caron was a pioneer in international environmental law. His early interest in international environmental law came from his time as an officer in the United States Coast Guard, serving in the Arctic. He encouraged me to apply for funding from the Ford Foundation and work with the National Research Council and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Council to produce a monograph on the Antarctic Treaty Regime. The work was published by the University of California Berkeley in 1994. With that, my focus on making international law's promises evident in the world was set. We spent afternoons discussing the US air campaign against Serbia and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk. We discussed the role of truth commissions and honest assessments of history. Believe it or not, we celebrated the signing of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, a beacon of liberal political hope for integration and peace in the 1990s.
I had two opportunities that year attributable to his guidance and support. I attended the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Program on Public International Law with funding from a Ford Foundation grant. I then worked as a legal intern at the United States Trade Representative during the final work on the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Professor Caron taught me to believe that international law should be based on justice, fairness, and reciprocity. The beauty of the twentieth century is found in the experiment of the League of Nations and the subsequent effort which we today seek to hold together, the United Nations. I hope we can construct a world of rights, respect, and responsibility before undertaking another world conflict.
Professor Caron’s voice motivated me to work at the international level for the World Intellectual Property Organization as an arbitrator for nearly twenty years. I returned to Harvard to obtain an MTS in comparative theology, ethics, and the application to the law. He is missed. But it is my tribute to him each day to continue working to defend human rights and the rule of international law in Uruguay and South America. David was also a Fulbright Scholar, and my work on the Fulbright Commission here in Uruguay would make him proud.
Historical Review of Uruguayan Passports
While the collection and review of all Uruguayan passports issued from 1918 to the present continue, I encourage you to review a set of passports that most clearly demonstrate the changes over time. I have investigated passports issued to natural citizens and naturalized citizens, also called legal citizens, for the many years I have obtained passports. The current collection shows a clear history of Uruguayan passport practice and provides insight into the Uruguayan nationality of Uruguayan legal citizens.
Because the practice of issuing passports, under customary international law and in light of the Vienna Convention on Consular Affairs, is one of the key activities a nation undertakes on behalf of its nationals, it is a helpful way to determine whether Uruguay formerly treated legal citizens as nationals and later, in 1994, arbitrarily withdrew that designation. Indeed, in 1994, Uruguay labeled its naturalized citizens, called legal citizens, as foreigners for the first time in its history.
A selection of the collected passports subject to the current historical review of Uruguayan nationality practices is available online.
Current Research Interests
I am currently working on an exhaustive review of the concept of nationality in Uruguayan law, practice, and history. This research includes an analysis of Uruguayan consular manuals and passports issued throughout the history of the Republic, international communications from 1830 to the present indicating Uruguay's interpretation of its nationality laws and Constitution, and Uruguayan international conventions and the role of international law in this issue. Possible violations of statelessness laws by the Uruguayan state and the possibilities and risks of seeking redress through the right to an amparo remedy are components of this research. In addition, comparative international materials are under review that examine the development of other Spanish speaking states that departed from the Cadiz Constitution and yet have managed to overcome the linguistic and historical division of nationals and citizens.
Pending Press: Constitutional Interpretation of Nationality in Uruguay
My most recent research has resulted in an accepted paper with the United States legal journal ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law. The full citation and link to the article, pending press, is here:
Mansfield, Andrew Scott (in press) "The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology", ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law: Vol. 29.
To review the article as submitted, you may download a copy in English or in Spanish. The article is being published in both English and Spanish in volume 29 of the journal, scheduled for June of 2023.