Can a plebiscite determine whether a Constitution of a state signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights may or may not violate a fundamental and non-derogable human right?

I recently finished a paper at Sigmund Freud University entitled Balancing Constitutional Conventionality Control in the Inter-American System with National Assertions of Sovereignty and Constitutional Supremacy. This paper, which I hope will be published soon, argues that subjecting fundamental, non-derogable rights to plebiscites is problematic and represents a structural weakness in the international human rights system.

I specifically criticize Uruguay's approach where constitutional provisions that violate human rights (particularly regarding nationality) can only be changed through plebiscites. The paper frames this as a "tyranny of the majority" problem, where the protection of fundamental rights becomes contingent on popular approval rather than being recognized as inherent and inalienable.

In Section VII.B, the paper explicitly addresses this tension, arguing that when "plebiscites or referendums validate discriminatory practices or enshrine impunity under the protection of popular sovereignty," they effectively obstruct compliance with international mandates. The author views this as fundamentally incompatible with the nature of non-derogable rights in the Inter-American system.

The paper's position is that when a constitution violates fundamental rights protected by the American Convention, the requirement to remedy this violation should not depend on majority approval through plebiscites, as this undermines the very purpose of international human rights protection - to safeguard fundamental rights regardless of domestic political circumstances.

The paper in Spanish is available for review here.