Legal Citizens of Uruguay are Not Foreigners

Uruguay’s most renewed international legal jurist in constitutional law and human rights wrote in 1995 that all citizens of Uruguay are nationals of Uruguay.

Why has this been ignored in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay in favor of less well-reasoned legal opinions, consisting mostly of repetitions of a legal text from the 1940s of dubious intellectual depth on the topic of nationality, repeated by legal scholars in Uruguay to this day?

Here, precisely, is the thesis of Dr. Pérez Pérez, elaborated by him in 1995, and, one might be shocked to learn, considered and somehow rejected by Parliament, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Exterior, and the DNIC in the period beginning in 2015 when Uruguayan legal citizens were denied nationality and stripped of functioning international passports by being labeled as “foreigners.”

As stated at the beginning (supra, para. 2-c), in my opinion, the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical (or fully coincide), at least in a democratic State such as the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners.

Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, born on 15 June 1937 in Montevideo, Uruguay, and passing away on 2 September 2017 in the same city, was perhaps the Uruguayan constitutional lawyer and jurist of the highest international prestige and Uruguay’s most respected figure in the realm of law and human rights. He held the esteemed position of Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 2010 to 2015. His dedication to the field was evident not only in his professional roles but also in his academic pursuits. He was educated at the University of the Republic.

Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez

Pérez Pérez's legal acumen was recognized early in his career. He graduated with honors from the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1960. He next continued his legal training in the United States, achieving highest honors at Southern Methodist University in Texas, and then a Master of Comparative Law from Columbia University. 

His teaching career was likewise extraordinary. Pérez Pérez began his career as a professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of the Republic in 1962. Initially teaching Constitutional Law and Public International Law, he soon ascended to the position of a Full Professor of Constitutional Law in 1970. His commitment to human rights was further solidified in 1994 when the Chair of Human Rights was instituted at the Faculty, and he was appointed as its Full Professor. 

His leadership qualities were evident when he was elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1973. However, his views were not consistent with the military dictatorship, and his teaching led to his swift dismissal. He was in exile for most of the civil-military dictatorship.

On the international front, Pérez Pérez's contributions were significant. He served the United Nations between 1977 and 1985, culminating his tenure as the Chief of the Administrative Review Department. He was recognized by the Municipality of Montevideo, where he served as the Director General of the Legal Department between 1990 and 1995. In 2006, he played a pivotal role as an Advisor to the Eastern Republic of Uruguay before the International Court of Justice, addressing the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over cellulose plants. In the latter part of his career, from 2010 onwards, Pérez Pérez served as a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the Organization of American States, further cementing his legacy in the field of human rights and law.

Why, precisely, did Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez conclude that all Uruguayan citizens are nationals of Uruguay, both legal citizens and natural citizens?

In his 1995 journal article entitled “Legal citizens are not foreigners,” Dr. Pérez Pérez presented a detailed argument based on Uruguayan constitutional history, Uruguayan constitutional methodology, and domestic and international law.

In an ironic reversal of his positions, almost cruel in its opposition to his true conclusion, lawyers for the Uruguayan government have justified the denial of nationality to Uruguayan naturalized citizens by quoting one small sentence in the article of Dr. Pérez Pérez, out of context. That is, when describing the “orthodox” and incorrect position in Uruguayan constitutional law, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that the foundational Constitutional legal scholar Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga held a view opposite that of Dr. Pérez Pérez. He wrote that Aréchaga, “The introducer of the juridical method in the teaching of Constitutional Law in our country held that … Nationality and citizenship are two entirely distinct individual conditions; and the latter does not proceed from the former, but from membership in a political society.” Further, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that Aréchaga held that “Nationality is a permanent state of individuals which undergoes no alteration whatever the point of the earth they inhabit; citizenship is, on the contrary, variable and alters with the different domiciles which men acquire in the different societies into which mankind is divided.”

Dr. Pérez Pérez did not believe that Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga was correct, either according to Uruguayan history or constitutional methodology. He was stating his position. But when a lawyer for the Uruguayan government wrote one of the key internal legal memorandums labeling Uruguayan legal citizens as foreigners, the only mention of Dr. Pérez Pérez is a citation that Dr. Pérez Pérez himself held the position attributed to Aréchaga. Such a citation is not an example of an outstanding legal citation or scholarship.

Dr. Pérez Pérez presented his legal arguments carefully. The work is so carefully constructed it is almost plodding to a lawyer trained in the United States. Undeniably, it is a renunciation and deconstruction of the legal arguments of those who have defended Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and the denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens.

The article, a presentation in tribute to the fifty-fifth anniversary of the legal journal La Justicia Uruguaya, indicates that Dr. Pérez Pérez addresses “the legal status of legal citizens within the legal system,” meaning the actual treatment such citizens receive. He provides two alternatives, one of which he advocates.

The position he identifies as “orthodox,” or accepted since the 1940s, is that of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. In this position, “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are different and heterogeneous since the former is of a real or sociological nature and the latter of a legal nature.” Notice that I indicate that Dr. Pérez Pérez is not stating fact but rather the assertion of a position he rejects.

A second position, one different from the position espoused by Aréchaga, is that “nationality and citizenship form like two concentric circles, so that all citizens are nationals, although only some nationals are citizens.” For example, this is a position held by the nation in which I practiced law for many years – the United States. Very few nationals of the United States live in the national territory and are subject to broad national sovereignty but do not have the right to participate politically, but there are some. This also describes the position of convicted felons in some states who retain nationality but are stripped of political citizenship.

A third position, diametrically opposed to Aréchaga,  is that “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical, at least in a democratic state.”  Dr. Pérez Pérez attributes this position to “democratic thought, fundamentally from Rousseau, was consecrated in the revolutions of the 18th century in North America and France and of the 19th century in Spanish-speaking America, and is in my opinion still valid as an interpretation of our constitutional texts, from 1830 to date.” 

This view of the philosophical and legal basis of Uruguayan law and the historical evolution of the Constitutions of South America, especially those available in historical context to the constituents of Uruguay in 1829, was fundamental to the research I conducted in my recently published review of Uruguayan nationality and citizenship. It was also, surprisingly, recently rejected out-of-hand, in a rather dismissive manner, by the Chair of Constitutional Law of the University of the Republic during what was intended to be an exchange of ideas at the University of the Republic.

What is this context and history that provides support for the fact that legal citizens were not considered foreigners by the constituents?

Dr. Pérez Pérez begins with the Constitution of Cádiz, the Constitution of 1812, drafted during the Peninsular War, when much of Spain was occupied by Napoleonic France. The Spanish, having retreated to Cádiz, provided the world with one of the original liberal constitutions. The Spanish constitution, of which the constituents were intimately familiar, provided the opportunity for foreigners who obtained a letter of naturalness (“naturaleza”) to become not just citizens of Spain but also Spaniards. Foreigners who obtained this status first became Spaniards and then later obtained a “special letter of citizenship.”

The term nationality, we are informed, was not commonly in use in 1812. It was not common as a concept even in 1829. We are directed to review Vezio Crisafulli and Domenico Nocetti, Vo. "Nazione", Enciclopedia del Diritto, volume XXVII, p. 789. Nevertheless, the concepts mirrored with less grace in the Uruguayan Constitution of 1830 were that all citizens of Spain were Spaniards (“nationals”), but only some Spaniards were citizens. This structure was followed by almost all the other Spanish-American constitutions. The Cádiz model has been followed in the Constitutions of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. I have explored the history of the unadopted Argentinian Constitution our constituents in Uruguay had in hand in 1829 and the Chilean constitution, both of which also adopt the Cádiz model. The fact that there is any confusion about whether the original Uruguayan Constitution also intended to make all citizens “Uruguayans,” therefore what we call nationals, has only to do with inartful drafting and not intention. That inartful drafting was alluded to and forgiveness was sought in the very introduction to the Constitution.

In 1829, Sr. Ellauri, crucial to the drafting of the Constitution and its management, stated, “The commission does not have the vanity to convince itself that it has done an original, great or perfect work.” He continued, “The great and the perfect was compatible with the limited lights of the members of the Commission, and with the difficulties of all kinds that they had to overcome to conclude a work as delicate as it was important.” The Constitution was drafted in various locations, under some need for haste, “mistakes have been suffered in the different accidental residences,” each of which “without the necessary comfort for recollection and meditation, without books and without a numerous society of enlightened citizens to consult.” I sit here today and read these words from my 1870 copy of the Discusion de la Constitucion del Estatado Oriental del Uruguay by Carlos M. de Nava, the copy of which I am privileged to have that was originally used by Jose Maria Vidal. I clearly cherish the Uruguayan Constitution, but I know its origin.

Let us return to the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, who concludes, of course, that:

Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners. This is so both in the case that we call all citizens "nationals," and in the case that (for certain reasons of constitutional text in our country) we reserve this term to distinguish natural citizens and designate legal citizens as "naturalized ". In other words, every national is a citizen, and every citizen is a national (or "naturalized"), even if not all of them can exercise political or active citizenship rights.

Why is this accurate and the best interpretation of the Uruguayan constitution?

1. This is in agreement with the liberal and democratic conceptions that inspired the Uruguayan constitution since the constituents of 1829.

2. There is no evidence that the original or later constituents distinguished between nationality and citizenship.

3. A proper use of the Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology, ironically developed extensively by Justino Jimenez de Arechaga, supports that legal citizens are not foreigners, or, in the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, “as regards the constitutional texts, in an interpretation that takes into account the provisions in force as a whole and extracts from them all the interpretative consequences in accordance with the general principles” does not support the denial of nationality to legal citizens.

4. Finally, more importantly than ever, given the growth of control of conventionality in the Inter-American system, denying nationality to legal citizens is contrary to public international law at both the customary and conventional levels.

Dr. Pérez Pérez expands upon and supports each of those four points, but the logic and evidence in his favor are overwhelming. It was after reviewing this article that I designed my further research, testing these propositions of Dr. Pérez Pérez, resulting in the publication of La Interpretación Constitucional De La Nacionalidad Uruguaya De Acuerdo Con La Metodologia Constitucional Uruguaya, available at the link below.

I encourage anyone interested to review the article by Dr. Pérez Pérez or to comment and engage with my article. I provide both links here.

https://www.nacionalidad.uy/downloads/PP_LJU_LCLNSE.pdf

https://somostodos.info/ilsa-esp

Announcing the publication of “The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology,” 29 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 443 (2023).

I am pleased to announce the publication of my article on the constitutional interpretation of Uruguayan nationality. The article was published in English and Spanish and is available in Westlaw. A summary of the work is provided below.

The National Directorate of Civil Identification (DNIC) of Uruguay today issues Uruguayan passports to legal Uruguayan citizens (naturalized citizens) but refuses to recognize them as nationals of Uruguay . In other words, legal Uruguayan citizens carry a passport that indicates that they are not nationals of Uruguay. The Uruguayan state claims that this results from an interpretation of the Uruguayan Constitution made in 2018. The interpretation is based only on secondary sources based on an opinion of an Uruguyan legal scholar, Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, articulated clearly by 1946. Uruguay is the only country in the world to declare that it has no path to naturalization for any immigrant. Uruguay instead allows "legal citizens" to obtain permanent status in Uruguay and obtain Uruguayan passports. The denial of nationality to legal citizens causes tremendous problems when these Uruguayans travel, places in question whether they receive diplomatic protection, and creates two classes of Uruguayans.

This manuscript analyzes the opinion of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and other Uruguayan constitutional legal scholars by applying the constitutional interpretative method developed by Uruguayan legal scholars. This method, labelled within Uruguay as the logical-systematic-teleological method of constitutional interpretation, contains precise instructions on the steps and approaches to be taken in interpretating the Constitution.

The source of the confusion and the resulting unique position that Uruguay maintains in denying any process for naturalization for its immigrants results from a misinterpretation of Article 81 of the current Constitution. The predecessor this clause, Article 71, was added only in the 1934 Constitution, and the surprising conclusion that Uruguay's constitution disallows all naturalization is not based on the interpretation most compatible with the Uruguay Constitution nor does it follow the Uruguayan method of constitutional interpretation.

Uruguay often interprets its Constitution through positive law. The current law governing nationality, Law 16.021, is based solely on the misinterpretation of Article 81. Efforts to reform Uruguayan law have begun and Uruguay could easily provide an interpretation of its Constitution on these issues that comports with its own internal interpretative methodology, expands rights in accord with its tradition, and that is in accord with Uruguay's international convention obligations.

La República Oriental del Uruguay es una asociación política de los habitantes en el territorio y sus participantes políticos, sus ciudadanos, son lo que la comunidad internacional considera uruguayos

La República Oriental del Uruguay, tal como se define en el artículo 1 de la Constitución, es la asociación política de los habitantes dentro de su territorio. Esta definición, que data de la constitución original de Uruguay en 1830, la diferencia de otras definiciones de estados o naciones en ese momento e incluso sigue siendo inusual en la actualidad. Para comprender el contexto en el que se redactó la constitución uruguaya en 1829, es esencial considerar varias influencias en sus redactores.

Al menos tres ejemplos previos de constituciones probablemente tuvieron importancia para quienes redactaron la constitución uruguaya. El primero es la Constitución Española de Cádiz de 1812, que estaría en vigor cuando las colonias españolas declararon su independencia. Según esta constitución, la nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios y la soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación, otorgándole el derecho exclusivo de establecer leyes fundamentales. El segundo ejemplo es la Constitución de 1819 de las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica, que no proporcionó una definición clara de "las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica". Por último, la Constitución de Argentina de 1826, aunque nunca se ratificó, comparte similitudes con la constitución uruguaya y probablemente fue consultada. Esta establece que la nación argentina es para siempre libre e independiente, no siendo propiedad de ningún individuo o familia, y adopta una forma de gobierno republicana representativa.

Las constituciones chilenas de 1822, 1828 y 1833 también ofrecen perspectivas sobre la definición de una nación. La Constitución de Chile de 1822 define la nación chilena como la unión de todos los chilenos, con la soberanía que reside esencialmente en la nación. La Constitución de 1828 amplía aún más, indicando que la nación chilena es una asociación política de todos los chilenos naturales y legales, libres e independientes de poderes extranjeros, y dividida en ocho provincias. La Constitución de 1833 no define explícitamente a Chile, pero reitera la naturaleza popular y representativa de su gobierno, la indivisibilidad de la República de Chile y la soberanía esencial de la nación delegada a las autoridades establecidas por la constitución.

Al comparar estos ejemplos, se hace evidente que la definición de la República Oriental del Uruguay se destaca. Mientras que la Constitución Española de 1812 define España como una reunión de españoles, incluyendo a individuos naturalizados, y las constituciones chilenas de 1822 y 1828 definen sus respectivas naciones como la unión de todos los chilenos, Uruguay define de manera única su República como una asociación política de habitantes. Esta distinción sigue siendo única, ya que otras naciones suelen referirse a su "nación" o "estado" en lugar de una asociación política.

La influencia de estos modelos constitucionales en los redactores de la constitución de Uruguay es evidente, pero la definición única de Uruguay refleja el contexto histórico y político específico en el que se estableció. Al definir la nación como una asociación política, Uruguay enfatiza la inclus ón y la naturaleza colectiva de su república, destacando la importancia de sus habitantes en la configuración de la gobernabilidad y legislación del país. Esta definición distintiva de la República Oriental del Uruguay sigue dando forma a su identidad como estado-nación, diferenciándolo de otros marcos constitucionales y resaltando la importancia de su pueblo en el entramado político del país.

La Constitución uruguaya de 1830 no denota explícitamente a los individuos como "nacionales" o "uruguayos", sino que habla en términos de ciudadanos - tanto naturales como legales. Concibe a la nación como una entidad política compuesta por sus ciudadanos, independientemente de su nacionalidad. La ciudadanía podía adquirirse a través del nacimiento en el país o cumpliendo con los criterios de ciudadanía legal.

Es posible que la Constitución haya considerado la "nacionalidad" como un concepto subordinado, menos significativo en comparación con la ciudadanía. La República Oriental del Uruguay no se constituyó sobre la base de la nacionalidad, sino como una asamblea política. Curiosamente, los individuos podían nacer y vivir en Uruguay sin ser ciudadanos, lo que generó un debate sobre el estatus de estos residentes no ciudadanos, especialmente las mujeres.

Justino Jiménez de Arechaga Moratorio señaló estas ambigüedades, pero a pesar de ello, la definición única de Uruguay de la nación enfatiza su naturaleza política. Los ciudadanos participan en la política, ejercen sus derechos y son miembros integrales de la república, con el derecho de permanecer, servir, cumplir deberes y poseer pasaportes internacionales. Todos bajo la protección de la República merecen estos derechos, no solo aquellos nacidos en suelo uruguayo o sus descendientes.

El entendimiento internacional de "nacional" se alinea más con la avanzada definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay que con el lugar de nacimiento. Si Uruguay ve la "nacionalidad" - el término globalmente utilizado para referirse a los ciudadanos - como problemática, podría demostrar su perspectiva progresista traduciéndola a su concepto de ciudadanía.

El enfoque de Uruguay puede indicar su avance sobre otras naciones en la ampliación del concepto de pertenencia al estado. En el derecho internacional, la idea de un estado no está necesariamente vinculada a la nación. Así, el estado uruguayo podría estar compuesto por personas de múltiples nacionalidades. Todos los ciudadanos pertenecen políticamente a Uruguay y se consideran "uruguayos" globalmente, a pesar de las diferentes nacionalidades.

Las discrepancias lingüísticas no deberían oscurecer los derechos sustantivos. Un individuo "sin estado" en inglés, "staatenlos" en alemán, o "no es miembro de un país" en chino apuntan hacia conceptos similares. Parece que la definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay se alinea más estrechamente con el concepto global de "nacionalidad" que cualquier otro término en Uruguay. Por lo tanto, la postura progresista de Uruguay en esta área no debería verse minada debido a un malentendido léxico.

Uruguay ha comprendido durante mucho tiempo un amplio entendimiento de "nacionalidad", aunque bajo la etiqueta de "ciudadanía", para evitar cualquier implicación étnica, nacionalista o nativista. Su posición histórica en cuanto a la ciudadanía inclusiva y la pertenencia al estado merece ser enaltecida. Su reconocimiento de que la ciudadanía no depende únicamente del lugar de nacimiento y su esfuerzo por remediar la apatridia ofreciendo ciudadanía legal, subrayan su compromiso de proteger los derechos individuales y garantizar una amplia participación nacional.

No se debe permitir que un malentendido en el vocabulario disminuya el liderazgo de Uruguay en este campo. Uruguay debe explicar que tuvo una amplia "nacionalidad" antes que casi cualquier otra nación en el mundo y que el concepto simplemente se etiquetó como "ciudadanía" para evitar connotaciones étnicas, nacionalistas o nativistas.

Nationality and Citizenship in Uruguayan Constitutional Doctrine

It is essential for the English-speaking world and the broader international legal community to understand the current legal framework separating nationality and citizenship in Uruguay. I start with one of the leading and honored experts in Uruguayan Constitution Law and International Law, Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas. Dr. Correa Freitas published the sixth edition of Derecho Constitucional Conemporaneo in 2019.

Dr. Correa Freitas indicates that nationality and citizenship hold significant legal-political implications, involving domestic Public Law, specifically Constitutional Law, and International Law. The complex historical context and evolving global landscape, including migratory flows and political events, have impacted the study and regulation of these concepts. Consequently, analyzing nationality and citizenship through Comparative Law, he writes, is crucial for identifying common criteria recognized by the international community to address the legal-political aspects of this phenomenon.

Moreover, if one can assert that Constitutional Law is the science of freedom, I believe that nationality and citizenship hold a position as significant as that, for it would be futile for an individual to be free if they lack a nation or are unable to actively participate in the political life of their state as a citizen.

To those trained in international law in jurisdictions other than Uruguay, the following will initially appear foreign and somewhat confusing. The experience may be one of finding oneself in an unfamiliar city with a map that has a legend, but the words on the legend, while used in other cities of the world, have a different meaning for the authors of this particular map. The map's author and the person using it think the words in the legend have a clear meaning. But the world and Uruguay, the person using the map and the author of the map in my metaphor, do not mean the same thing by the exact words.

It is easy to get lost when that is the case. But what follows is a clear and precise explanation of the Uruguayan legal doctrine.

Dr. Correa Freitas argues that it is crucial to distinguish between nationality and citizenship, as they are different concepts that sometimes need clarification. Nationality is an original link between a person and a State or Nation, established by birth or blood connection with parents. On the other hand, citizenship is a political relationship between an individual and a State, conferring certain rights and duties. International law emphasizes the right to nationality and the right to change nationality while asserting that no person can have more than one nationality. Nationality is opposed to foreignness, and citizenship is divided into natural and legal citizenship. Consequently, it is essential to differentiate between nationality and foreignness, as well as natural and legal citizenship.

In Comparative Law, Dr. Corre Freitas indicates, the distinction between nationality and citizenship is well-established. Various constitutions, such as those of Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Peru, distinguish between nationals and foreigners and regulate citizenship separately. They address the rights and duties of citizens, focusing on aspects such as age and political qualifications. This distinction highlights the importance of understanding the differences between nationality and citizenship in a legal context.

It is worth noting, and perhaps marking for later discussion, that the examples provided in this text do not support an assertion that any of the listed nations deny nationality to naturalized citizens. The examples do provide information on how each nation addresses the differences between being a national and having the right to participate in the political life of the State.

Continuing to review the outstanding explanation of this view of the Uruguayan Constitution, Dr. Correa Freitas informs that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, nationality and citizenship are regulated in Section III, with natural citizens being those born in the country or children of Oriental parents who settle and register in the Civic Registry. Nationality is not lost even by naturalizing in another country and can be regained by settling in the Republic and registering in the Civic Registry. The Constitution adopts "ius soli" and "ius sanguinis" criteria for nationality, with Oriental nationality being irrevocable and allowing for dual nationality. However, confusion exists between nationality and natural citizenship, as demonstrated by the illogical provision of suspension of citizenship for not reaching eighteen years of age.

The conclusion on the doctrine of Uruguayan nationality and its comparison to citizenship can then be summarized.

In summary: applying the logical-systematic interpretation criterion, it can be concluded that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, a distinction is made between nationals and foreigners on one hand, and natural citizens and legal citizens on the other hand. According to the constitutional text, nationality and natural citizenship are synonymous, meaning that every man or woman born in Uruguay, strictly speaking in the territory of the Republic, or a child of an Oriental father or mother who settles and registers in the Civic Registry, is a natural citizen (Article 74) and therefore, national, irrevocably according to Article 81.

In 1989, Law No. 16,021 was enacted to regulate nationality in Uruguay due to confusion in the existing Uruguayan Constitution. The law recognizes the criteria of "jus soli" (place of birth) and "jus sanguinis" (blood ties with father or mother), granting Uruguayan nationality to those born in the Republic's territory and their children, regardless of birthplace.

Initially, Law No. 16,021 didn't grant natural citizenship to children of persons born abroad who were granted Uruguayan nationality. Law No. 19,362, enacted on December 31, 2015, corrected this by granting natural citizenship to such children.

Law No. 16,021 also interprets Article 74 of the Constitution, defining "avecinamiento" (settlement) and its requirements for obtaining Uruguayan nationality. Amended by Law No. 18,858 on December 23, 2011, "avecinamiento" occurs when actions unequivocally demonstrate a person's intention, such as living in the country for over three months, renting or acquiring property, establishing a business, obtaining employment, or enrolling in an educational institution for a minimum of two months. Two of these requirements must be presented before the Electoral Court, which verifies the information and proceeds with registration (Article 5, as amended by Law No. 19,362 of 12/31/15).

The summary of Uruguayan law on this matter is stated succinctly.

After analyzing the Uruguayan constitutional system and considering comparative law, the following conclusions can be drawn:

a) The Uruguayan Constitution confuses the concepts of nationality and citizenship, particularly between nationality and natural citizenship.

b) There is a significant trend, especially in Latin American constitutionalism, to separately and rigorously regulate nationality and citizenship.

c) Generally, the criteria of "jus soli" and "jus sanguinis" are accepted as means of acquiring nationality, without prejudice to admitting naturalization.

d) It is advisable to promote the signing of international treaties that regulate the acquisition and loss of nationality and conflicts of dual nationality.

e) In a future constitutional reform in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, provisions related to nationality and citizenship should be modified to adapt them to modern trends in doctrine and comparative constitutional law.

Dr. Correa Freitas leaves the possibility that the Uruguayan Constitution could be subject to a reform to adapt to modern trends and states that there is no prejudice in admitting naturalization as a source of nationality in such a reform.

Uruguay is “the true California” - La Republica Oriéntale del Uruguay - Pubblicazione Ufficiale

In 1870, the Consul General of Uruguay published an immigration guide for Italian immigrants. It was written in Italian. The purpose of the publication was to provide “positive, truthful and practical piece of advice that will genuinely and without deception or subterfuge clarify to the emigrant what lies ahead.” Why? Because “emigrants often do not know what to decide, whether to believe those who promise them paradise or those who predict hell.”

In addition to extolling the virtues of emigrating from Italy to Uruguay, the Consul hoped that immigrants would provide labor and industry to develop the Uruguayan economy and infrastructure. He wrote, “the Republic of Uruguay, amidst peace and prosperity, is making giant strides towards progress, and all it needs are hands, hands, and more hands.”

The publication does not speak of nationality. It does not address citizenship or the process of obtaining it. But it does indicate that its “citizens,” without dividing the natural citizens from the legal citizens, are all called “Orientals.”

Geopolitically, commercially, and politically, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay takes its name from the ancient designation "Banda Oriental," which served during the times of Spanish domination to indicate the province located to the east of the Uruguay River. For the same reason, the citizens of Uruguay are called "Orientals."

The ease of migration is stressed. The Consul explained the services available on arrival. The publication includes a table indicating that the wages in Uruguay exceeded those in Europe. When all of this is considered, the Consul indicates emigrating is advantageous.

It can be said without exaggeration that the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, without exploiting its gold, is a true California, with the difference that in the Gold Rush era, California was a social chaos, while in the Oriental Republic, there exists a well-ordered, moral, and hardworking society, of which more than sixty thousand Italians form a part and have improved their condition through work, which is the source of all wealth.

It is difficult to sufficiently emphasize Uruguay's “open door” policy at this time. A Central Office of Immigration was established in 1865, only 35 years after the founding of the Republic. The Consul, in this pamphlet seeking to encourage immigration, described the functions of the office.

There is a central immigration office in Montevideo, which has the sole purpose of protecting immigrants who arrive in the territory of the Republic, providing them with the necessary means and providing them with the information and advice they may need to obtain a position that can truly improve their fate and fortune.

This institution dates back to December 2, 1865, when a presidential decree appointed an Immigration Commission (which includes two Italians, Messrs. Sivori and Folie) and a statistical office concerning it.

The Central Office of Immigration, located at 79 Colon Street in Montevideo, provides invaluable services to immigrants free of charge. Even though they arrive in the country completely new and unknown, they find in this office a sincere friend, a reliable guide, and a wise and diligent protector.

Today, in 2023, Uruguay is in another period of immigration, though nowhere near the scale of its historical periods of immigration. Perhaps its earlier history of welcoming new citizens is worth considering in deciding whether Uruguay today also needs “hand, hands, hands” to prosper. Clearly, the current population, most of whom arrived during this period of immediate and free social services encouraging immigration, benefited from Uruguay’s earlier policies and expenditure of tax funds.

In 1870 what services didi Uruguay provide, from the public treasury, to ensure justice and integration of its immigrants?

The main functions of the Central Office of Immigration are as follows:

It arranges for the landing of immigrants arriving at the port, sending a person from the office aboard ships arriving with immigrants and transporting all those who wish to stay in the Oriental State to the shore, providing them with free lodging and maintenance until they have found work or occupation.

It gathers all the necessary and most appropriate data in order to provide immigrants with all the useful information about the country, as well as to know where workers are particularly needed. To this end, it also keeps a special register where all the requests for workers and laborers made by its agents in the countryside and other parts of the Republic, as well as by private individuals both inside and outside the city, are recorded.

In this way, it facilitates and indeed tirelessly works to find a suitable position, according to their aptitude, for every immigrant who has turned to it. It arranges for the transport of the applicants who live in the countryside to the place where they are wanted, and when necessary, it covers all the costs of their transportation to any part of the Republic.

It intervenes in the contracts entered into between private individuals and immigrants who have placed themselves under its protection in order to protect their rights and interests. It issues the relevant certificates accrediting the quality of the immigrant. It arranges for immigrants settled in the country to write to their relatives and families overseas with punctuality and facilitates the means of doing so with the least possible expense.

Finally, it intervenes in everything that can be useful and advantageous to immigrants, protecting them in all the difficult circumstances they may encounter, whether due to lack of means of subsistence or work, or due to rights or interests that may be defrauded, or even due to violations of police edicts or other minor violations of the laws of the country that may not be well known or well understood by them.

The so-called Foreign Colonies - Reasons for Their Existence and Ways to Nationalize Immigrants

Carlos María Ramírez Álvarez y Obes (1848-1898) was a Uruguayan journalist, essayist, novelist, and politician born in Rio Grande del Sur, Brazil. He graduated in Jurisprudence in 1868 and started his journalism career in the newspaper El Siglo, where he expressed his opposition to General Lorenzo Batlle's government. Due to his strong stance, he was deported to Buenos Aires with his brother Gonzalo.

Ramírez joined the Colorado Party during the Revolution of the Lances but soon became disillusioned and focused on creating a new political movement, the Constitutional Party. He taught constitutional law at the University of the Republic and later held various public positions, including Fiscal of Government and Finance and Uruguay's Legation in the Empire of Brazil.

During Lorenzo Latorre's period, Ramírez dedicated himself to researching national history. He compiled his political ideas in a pamphlet titled "La guerra civil y los partidos políticos del Uruguay" (1882), which outlined the basic principles of the projected Constitutional Party. He was involved in the creation of the newspaper El Plata, which served as the voice of his ideology.

Ramírez participated in the first Pedagogical Congress in South America held in Buenos Aires in 1882. In addition to his political activities, he wrote novels, essays, and several posthumously published works. He was appointed Minister of Finance in Juan Lindolfo Cuestas' government in 1891 and later served as a Senator from 1893 to 1898.

Here I translate a two-part article Ramírez published in 1871, in La Bandera Radical.

La Bandera Radical, 18 June 1871: Year 1, Number 21.

FIRST ARTICLE

During the three years in which the daily press offered us a place, we remember with pleasure having devoted our intelligence and time to the unpleasant elucidation of legal issues regarding diplomatic immunities, the extension of the right of asylum, justice, and opportunity for foreign claims, and many others among the most serious that the jurisprudence of modern nations entails.

What motivated us to deal with these tedious matters was undoubtedly not the inclinations of a legalistic spirit, by which, far from feeling dominated, we have always felt an instinctive repulsion. It is not the confusing laws written by men or nations in their variable codes and statutes but rather the simple law engraved by the Orderer of the world in the natural essence of human relations, the great object of study that has always presented itself with enchantment to our eyes. And undoubtedly, that is why we experienced true intellectual pleasure when we descended to explore the labyrinth of contradictions that the internal law presents.

These high sentiments are impenetrable in their depth and reproducing them in words is like trying to capture a fleeting breeze. It is possible to capture the sentiments only with a general approach to the resolutions adopted. The principle, the sentiment of sovereignty and national independence, led us to discover supreme importance in fixing the just limit in which the country's jurisdiction should only yield its rights to the respect and rights of a foreign power. The eminent Vico speaks to us of civic modesty; an Oriental publicist has developed this expression, telling us of republican modesty; before civic or republican modesty, there is patriotic modesty.

New and weak peoples of America and the South have found themselves in a peculiar situation concerning the powerful nations that exist in the Old World; needing population and capital to complement the efficient development of their laws and achieve complete control of their destinies, they have had to maintain generous and cordial relations with the European states that could provide them with those indispensable instruments of organization and progress but in determining this consecutive and immediate contact and producing such a vast increase in the natural solidarity of nations, a highly dangerous situation has been created.

The Spanish American peoples have appeared as servile tributaries of other peoples; they have gathered in their midst all kinds of heterogeneous and diverse elements; they have presented a body without unity or strength of their own to the abusive pretensions of the great powers with whom they have inevitably placed themselves in a very close alliance of interests and destinies.

From here has resulted that very special jurisprudence that Europe has tried to impose on America, equating it in its international relations with the semi-savage peoples of the East; that very special jurisprudence which has cost so many contributions to the honor and wealth of all South American peoples, and particularly the two Republics of the Plata.

It is true, as General Mitre observes in a recent article, that the abusive demands have always encountered discussion and protest, so that the principles have been saved within the scope of reason and law; America can claim as a triumph of its own doctrines, in a high degree, the declaration that has compensated, to a certain extent, for the damages suffered by its British subjects in the course of the Franco-German war.

However, the great national question is not yet resolved with the honest and loyal recognition of the principles that should serve as a basis for it, by someone who is generally acknowledged to possess remarkable competence as a statesman.

Inside our house, there is an Italian colony, a Spanish colony, a French colony, a German colony, a Brazilian colony, a British colony, and many others... Where does the Oriental sovereignty stand?

These are not agricultural, industrial, or commercial colonies spontaneously formed by accidental interaction and governed by the common principles of civil societies; no! They are genuine projections of the motherland, strongly organized with the bond of their nationality of origin, aspiring to form a distinct entity under the protection and direction of their respective diplomatic Minister, or even their respective consular agent!

They don't think with our ideas, nor speak our language, nor live with our customs, nor familiarize themselves with our institutions, nor blend with our nationality.

Concentrated within their own circles, each of the so-called foreign colonies imprints its own special character on everything that belongs to them and everything related to them. If they engage in trade, we have English trade, German trade, Italian trade, etc. If they acquire real estate, we come across the flag announcing a Spanish property, a French property, etc. If they raise offspring, a false baptismal certificate comes, which, in defiance of all our laws, maintains the perpetuity of the nationality of origin and isolates the indigenous population amidst an immense sea of foreign aggregations!

How can we explain this recent phenomenon, which, upon observation, cannot help but raise doubts and patriotic hesitations in our souls? Is it the work of our institutions, the work of our laws? No, because our institutions are far superior to those of the peoples who favor us with their immigration - no, because our laws open up the broadest field for the unification of all the elements that may be welcomed in the country.

The codes establish perfect equality of civil rights between natives and foreigners; taxes do not weigh more heavily on the latter than on the former; even our rivers are open to all the flags of the world.

As for exercising public rights, it is enough to say that we offer citizenship with as much generosity as the most generous nation on earth. In vain, General Pacheco said that if old Rome existed in all its splendor, he would not exchange the title of Oriental citizen for that of a Roman citizen. We must acknowledge with sorrow that this is not generally thought of in this way; a false document would today be much more valuable to many people than the genuine title of an Oriental citizen.

The laws of the United States, whose liberality towards foreigners is often praised, are far from offering as many privileges as our laws; it is enough to point out two aspects of North American legislation to understand its spirit - one cannot be a landowner or a bank director without being a citizen of the Union.

If we were to establish these principles, we would not achieve foreigners becoming naturalized to be property owners or bankers, but we would make them emigrate to other countries instead of having them as guests. Common sense has always told us that we must open wide all doors through which the immigrants of the world may feel enticed to enter our home.

With this idea in mind, we have not done everything that can be done, but we have done enough to demonstrate that our laws are not the real cause of the profound national anarchy in which we live.

Could it be our habits, our customs, our sociability? Anyone who knows the country knows that foreigners are everywhere and are received by everyone with spontaneous demonstrations of cordiality and sympathy.

Their race and religion do not concern anyone in the slightest.

In the family and industry, society and commerce, they are received as friends and brothers.

At every step, their opinion is invoked, and their cooperation is sought.

Governments seek their support, and revolutionaries place their hopes in them.

From there, the foreign population is sought after by the law and sought after by men who identify entirely with our own national life, and yet they remain indifferent, detached, entrenched in the traditionalism of their existing traditions, contradicting in a way the age-old wisdom of the adage that tells us: where there is property, there is the homeland.

How can we explain this phenomenon?

For our part (and in a forthcoming article, we hope to demonstrate this clearly), we believe this is the inevitable result of our old factions and the ongoing civil war in which they are embroiled.

La Bandera Radical, 2 July 1871: Year 1, Number 23

SECOND ARTICLE

Jules Duval, the illustrious historian of human migration in the 19th century, wrote that towards the end of 1856, when the population was flocking more strongly to North America, a party formed in some parts of the Union that, exaggerating the famous principle of Monroe, aimed to put limitations on the introduction of foreign elements. This party worked and agitated everywhere; propaganda, public meetings, the organization of conventions, and even some popular excesses were the visible signs with which it appeared on the scene, without achieving anything other than to maintain itself on it for the brief space of two years.

By 1856, the Know-Nothing party had completely disappeared because public sentiment rejected the idea of finding a national danger in the great phenomenon that had contributed so much to the development of the United States.

If a similar party were to appear in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, its existence would also be equally precarious and temporary; but for very different reasons than those that produced the same outcome in the Republic of the North. Whether our patriotic susceptibilities want it or not, without foreign capital or a foreign population, our nationality would never attain the necessary elements to call itself such and rise on the ladder of progress, following the harmonic movement of humanity. The immigration that comes to our shores could be a great national danger. Yet, we would be morally forced to receive it because the opposite intention, the isolation of Paraguay during the reign of Francia and Lopez, the consummation of all possible dangers, would imply suicide.

The American Union finds itself, and found itself since the mid-19th century, in a very different situation, because it already contained everything necessary to constitute a great association of its own life and growing influence on the destiny of all humanity. Suppose the Union opens its doors to the emigrant classes of Europe. In that case, it is not so much to increase the population of the lands it already occupies, but to satisfy its colossal aspirations for expansion, invading like a continuous tide, with the wave of the most beautiful civilization in the world, the fertile deserts that extend around its States.

In general, North Americans are accused of being conquerors, but the true conquest they carry out, without needing any other, is the conquest of virgin nature and the exhausted elements that Europe sends to revitalize its essence in the powerful source of democratic institutions. Within the Union, the foreigner immediately identifies his life with the life of the people he joins because, from the very first moment, he sees the development of the interests he brings or the realization of the future he hopes for linked to the unfolding of that life. The vague memory of the homeland consecrated by the tradition of sentiment is overshadowed by the active consciousness of a new homeland that attracts him with the generous offering of man's most necessary and esteemed goods. The head of the family may die in the old religion, but the new religion remains in his home, and the descendants of the fortunate emigrant know and love only the same homeland in which they were born.

Such is the force of national assimilation that the United States, offering liberalities to immigration, have come to declare that the children of foreigners can choose at their discretion between their nationality of origin and their nationality of birth - (See Jules Duval - Emigration in the 19th century: page 189.) How not to see that the United States have done so, like the mother who offers ample freedom to her tender children, sure that filial love will keep them constantly in her care!

With similar institutions and with an equally hospitable character, as we demonstrated in our first article, the Oriental Republic, as it advances in its independent career and progresses as a receptacle for foreign immigration, manages only to form a juxtaposition of colonies, under whose regime and preponderance, nationality loses its strength, dignity, and prestige. It is governed by the same psychological laws as the opposite phenomenon observed in the great Republic of the North. The foreigner comes to our shores; he is attracted by the fame of our fields' fertility, the high remuneration of work, or the ease with which he can advance in the various careers of commerce. We now have him transplanted to our soil. Let's watch him grow like an exotic plant.

People have an irresistible tendency to inform themselves about the issues being debated in the land where they live, an irresistible tendency to establish immediate and permanent communication with the society in which their person is and where their interests are rooted. It is the effect of the instinct for sociability, on the one hand, and intelligent and foresighted selfishness, on the other - selfishness and sociability, two inseparable feelings of the human heart. Obeying these feelings, the foreigner directs an inquisitive gaze at the political stage of the country and finds a fierce struggle between two factions that do not represent any practical program of principles, reforms, improvements, or any of the aspirations that can favor or flatter the legitimate conveniences of a man completely alien to the traditions of a people. He finds the fierce struggle of two factions that tear each other apart to death for slogans and passions of a dark past where virtue and crime, glory and ferocity, are all involved in an indecipherable enigma of civil convulsions, as terrible as the most terrible ones that the annals of humanity have known. Finally, he finds the sterile and bloody debate of historical divisions that have always led nations astray when seeking the peaceful and fruitful movement of the forces that operate in the growth of societies and the happiness of their members! Then comes the reaction of sociability and selfishness. The foreigner turns his gaze away from that dark picture and looks for the center among his fellow nationals where he can expand his feelings and achieve the irresistible community of legitimate interests. We would be very mistaken if this is not the deep internal cause that outlines, at the heart of our sociability, the unique creation of foreign colonies.

Here, as always, the exception only serves to confirm the rule. There was a moment when all the inhabitants of the country, or at least the capital where its vital forces are concentrated, came together in a single national sentiment, fighting for the exact cause in a heroic defense. It was because, at that time, the struggle had been defined in clear and specific terms, revealing to all foreigners the interests at stake in the conflict and also the combatants where general interests found representation and protection. Subsequently, disastrous events occurred; the factions were fatally reconstituted with their old leaders at the helm; a continuous succession of equal mistakes and crimes became the prominent feature of the struggle. And then, the identification of a great moment began to break apart; sympathies that were once concentrated in one point became divided and wavered uncertainly from one extreme to the other until they turned away from both, definitively establishing the deep national divorce that is characterizing itself with the new aggregations of forces that, in a different situation, should strengthen and bring splendor to the Nation.

The phenomenon described would lose much of its influence if the struggle of the historical parties did not inevitably take on the form of a chronic war. In times of peace, even if only for economic interests and the realization of the physiocratic motto - laissez-faire, laissez-passer - the munificence of nature and work would reconcile the foreigner with the intrinsic conditions of the country, and their descendants would come to form a center where political transformations would find the most vigorous resources for their action. The constant civil war has very diverse effects, in which the parties set the Republic ablaze.

The first to suffer the effects of this scourge are labor, capital, and the general wealth of the country. Just when the foreigner begins to savor the fruit of their toil and gather the harvest of their efforts, political convulsions hinder the progress of mercantile business and relax all the springs of industrial activity. The convulsion passes quickly, and when hopes were about to be reborn with the prosperity of labor, the political convulsion comes to cover the horizon with the glow of destruction and bloodshed.

Thus, years go by under the fatal regime of anarchy, with no more respite than brief moments of armistice. That land, which God and institutions made generously hospitable, is turned by our parties into a treacherous trap of turmoil and ruin. Instead of forming a beautiful Eden, people seem determined to create an inferno.

In this way, immigration will retreat from our ports; emigration will begin in our own home; and if, for providential reasons concerning the future of the Republic, emigration does not occur on a large scale and immigration continues to flow excessively, we will see colonies take shape, not just as a social phenomenon, but as a political organization. Civil war brings plunder, dispossession, and humiliations that the foreign population cannot bear with impunity since none of their positive interests are involved in the causes and outcomes of that war. They suffer losses without compensation; they are ruined without recognizing a just cause that justifies sacrificing everything that linked them to our land. How can you expect them not to complain? How can you expect them not to defend their most legitimate rights? How can you expect them not to turn to the authorities of their country if yours cannot compensate or even put an end to their grievances?

There is even more to the issue. It is well known that civil war stimulates and develops the violent tendencies of people; periods of political upheaval are always times of excess and private crimes. As if the state that a famous philosopher assumes to be natural for humans were the case, or at least the state before the human condition, it is true that bloodshed has an intoxicating and contagious influence within political societies. Murders are the inevitable entourage of war. The most valuable asset, life, which can never be replaced, is left at the mercy of the most terrible threats. Meanwhile, the force of social repression disappears. In the dire necessities of the struggle, a criminal becomes a soldier, if not a leader, and it would be foolish to deprive oneself of him. In supreme moments, which are constantly repeated, a battalion is formed from the public jail that soon becomes a veteran and a patriot. All the mechanisms of the judicial administration are relaxed, and the sense of justice loses its energy in all the magistracies of the country. There are no guarantees for human life, nor punishment for murderers. Do you think foreigners will let themselves be killed with impunity? Do you think they will not seek someone to guarantee their lives? Do you think they will not try by all possible means to find punishment for the criminals who have preyed on their countrymen? At every step, we have to see that foreign ministers, harassed by their subjects and representing the dearest interests of their citizens, demand that those accused of crimes committed on our territory be tried outside of our territory, as Mr. Munro did not long ago in notes as truthful as they are depressing about our social state.

Here is why in our country there are these colonies of immigrants with an exclusive spirit, with their own interests, with an independent existence, constantly demanding the intervention of an authority that represents and satisfies their peculiar collective needs.

Rejected from identification with our historical parties, each national group concentrates within its own circle; without protection for its members' property and life in the constant turmoil of war, it naturally aspires to form a government that ensures the enjoyment of these fundamental rights.

By themselves, nothing is lacking for these national groups to constitute colonies; it is necessary to recognize that they have had reason to be called that way.

Can this situation last?

Are there ways to repair such great evils?

We will express our opinion in another article.

A copy of the original in Spanish is available here.

A Life Dedicated to International Law

As we recently marked the fifth anniversary of his passing on February 20th, I have been reflecting on the life and work of my mentor, David D. Caron, in the field of public international law.

His influence on my life, education, and professional growth was profound.

Professor Caron, or David, as he asked to be called early in our work, served as the dean of the King's College London School of Law and was an emeritus professor of the UC Berkeley School of Law. He was a renowned expert in international law, focusing on international dispute resolution, international courts and tribunals, and international environmental law. He was a member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and a Judge ad hoc of the International Court of Justice.

He guided me through Berkeley Law on a path of demanding classes about International Law, International Human Rights, and International Environmental Law. He then counseled me to take courses on International Business Transactions, Private International Dispute Resolution, Constitutional Law, and International Trade Law. Passing through the gauntlet of these courses, Professor Caron listened and advised me on research in international law. I investigated the Tinoco Arbitration, a ruling that ordered the Costa Rican government established by a 1917 coup d’etat to pay certain UK loans and the role of the "recognition" of governments.

Professor Caron was a pioneer in international environmental law. His early interest in international environmental law came from his time as an officer in the United States Coast Guard, serving in the Arctic. He encouraged me to apply for funding from the Ford Foundation and work with the National Research Council and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Council to produce a monograph on the Antarctic Treaty Regime. The work was published by the University of California Berkeley in 1994. With that, my focus on making international law's promises evident in the world was set. We spent afternoons discussing the US air campaign against Serbia and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk. We discussed the role of truth commissions and honest assessments of history. Believe it or not, we celebrated the signing of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, a beacon of liberal political hope for integration and peace in the 1990s.

I had two opportunities that year attributable to his guidance and support. I attended the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Program on Public International Law with funding from a Ford Foundation grant. I then worked as a legal intern at the United States Trade Representative during the final work on the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Professor Caron taught me to believe that international law should be based on justice, fairness, and reciprocity. The beauty of the twentieth century is found in the experiment of the League of Nations and the subsequent effort which we today seek to hold together, the United Nations. I hope we can construct a world of rights, respect, and responsibility before undertaking another world conflict.

Professor Caron’s voice motivated me to work at the international level for the World Intellectual Property Organization as an arbitrator for nearly twenty years. I returned to Harvard to obtain an MTS in comparative theology, ethics, and the application to the law. He is missed. But it is my tribute to him each day to continue working to defend human rights and the rule of international law in Uruguay and South America. David was also a Fulbright Scholar, and my work on the Fulbright Commission here in Uruguay would make him proud.

Historical Review of Uruguayan Passports

While the collection and review of all Uruguayan passports issued from 1918 to the present continue, I encourage you to review a set of passports that most clearly demonstrate the changes over time. I have investigated passports issued to natural citizens and naturalized citizens, also called legal citizens, for the many years I have obtained passports. The current collection shows a clear history of Uruguayan passport practice and provides insight into the Uruguayan nationality of Uruguayan legal citizens.

Because the practice of issuing passports, under customary international law and in light of the Vienna Convention on Consular Affairs, is one of the key activities a nation undertakes on behalf of its nationals, it is a helpful way to determine whether Uruguay formerly treated legal citizens as nationals and later, in 1994, arbitrarily withdrew that designation. Indeed, in 1994, Uruguay labeled its naturalized citizens, called legal citizens, as foreigners for the first time in its history.

A selection of the collected passports subject to the current historical review of Uruguayan nationality practices is available online.

Current Research Interests

I am currently working on an exhaustive review of the concept of nationality in Uruguayan law, practice, and history. This research includes an analysis of Uruguayan consular manuals and passports issued throughout the history of the Republic, international communications from 1830 to the present indicating Uruguay's interpretation of its nationality laws and Constitution, and Uruguayan international conventions and the role of international law in this issue. Possible violations of statelessness laws by the Uruguayan state and the possibilities and risks of seeking redress through the right to an amparo remedy are components of this research. In addition, comparative international materials are under review that examine the development of other Spanish speaking states that departed from the Cadiz Constitution and yet have managed to overcome the linguistic and historical division of nationals and citizens.

Pending Press: Constitutional Interpretation of Nationality in Uruguay

My most recent research has resulted in an accepted paper with the United States legal journal ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law. The full citation and link to the article, pending press, is here:

Mansfield, Andrew Scott (in press) "The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology", ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law: Vol. 29.

To review the article as submitted, you may download a copy in English or in Spanish. The article is being published in both English and Spanish in volume 29 of the journal, scheduled for June of 2023.

• English language version

• Spanish language version